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Abstract
Cooperative communications is obviously an evolution in wireless networks due to its no-
ticeable advantages such as increasing the coverage as well as combating fading and shadow-
ing effects. However, the broadcast characteristic of a wireless medium which is exploited
in cooperative communications leads to a variety of security vulnerabilities. As cooperative
communication networks are globally expanded, they expose security attacks and threats more
than ever. Primarily, researchers have focused on upper layers of network architectures to meet
the requirements for secure cooperative transmission while the upper-layer security solutions
are incapable of combating a number of security threats, e.g., jamming attacks. To address
this issue, physical-layer security has been recommended as a complementary solution in the
literature.
In this thesis, physical layer attacks of the cooperative communication systems are stud-
ied, and corresponding security techniques including cooperative jamming, beamforming and
diversity approaches are investigated. In addition, a novel security solution for a two-hop
decode-and-forward relaying system is presented where the transmitters insert a random phase
shift to the modulated data of each hop. The random phase shift is created based on a shared
secret among communicating entities. Thus, the injected phase shift confuses the eavesdropper
and secrecy capacity improves.
Furthermore, a cooperative jamming strategy for multi-hop decode-and-forward relaying
systems is presented where multiple non-colluding illegitimate nodes can overhear the com-
munication. The jamming signal is created by the transmitter of each hop while being sent
with the primary signal. The jamming signal is known at the intended receiver as it is accord-
ing to a secret common knowledge between the communicating entities. Hence, artificial noise
misleads the eavesdroppers, and decreases their signal-to-noise-ratio. As a result, secrecy ca-
pacity of the system is improved. Finally, power allocation among cooperative jamming and
main signal is proposed to ensure that suggested scheme enhances secrecy.
Keywords: Cooperative communication, physical layer, secrecy
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”Do not worry about your difficulties in mathematics, I can
assure you mine are still greater.”
Albert Einstein
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Security of Wireless
Communications
Wireless communication is one of the most important achievements of mankind since it pro-
vides transmission of information over faraway nodes without requiring the wires. Long-
distance radio transmission was invented by Guglielmo Marconi in 1901 [1]. Since then, many
advantages of wireless communications have facilitated humans life. For example, the mobility
of wireless communications provides services for the users in almost anywhere and increases
the coverage. It can be in a mall, in an airport or in a park. Interestingly, the no-wired nature of
wireless communications, makes it very convenient for using, compared to the wired systems
in which a cable is always required while the length of the cable could be a major concern.
Moreover, the wireless systems are capable of providing service for a large number of users.
For example, it is expected that by 2020, and the time that 5G will be deployed, there is a
larger number of cellphone subscribers in the world such that each macro-cell must serve up to
1000 subscribers [2]. In addition, wireless communication systems have cheaper installation
and maintenance costs compared to the terrestrial communications in which not only all paths
must be wired, but also changes in the cabling plan involve additional fees.
On the other hand, the widespread users of wireless communications are now suffering from
security issues more than ever. For instance, in early 2015, a cyber security consultant claimed
that he was able to control the aircraft engine by connecting to the onboard wifi [3]. Moreover,
lack of security in the applications installed on cellphones has been frequently exploited by
hackers to track users and access their information. Therefore, it can be said that although the
broadcast nature of wireless medium, which reverts back to radio propagation, eases human
lives, it intensively introduces many security vulnerabilities and issues. Hereon, it must be
pointed out that unfortunately the ever increasing rate of wireless communication deployments
and applications on one side, and the rate of corresponding security solutions on the other side,
are not matched. Thus, this noticeable gap needs to be addressed. However, the wired systems
are not impacted by the security issues as much as the wireless systems because of their closed
architecture. In this chapter, due to the importance of security in wireless communication
systems, the objective is to study the background and the basis of the security in wireless
communication systems.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction to Security of Wireless Communications
1.1 Background of Security in Wireless Communications
Availability of wireless medium, which is utilized by wireless communication systems, has
led to a variety of security risks and threats. It is vital to enhance the security of wireless
communications since it is very easy for eavesdroppers to overhear wireless signals that are
transmitted in the air.
The key concepts of wireless communications security is classified into four categories
which each attack usually intends to threaten one or more categories. Thus, it is necessary to be
aware of associated principals to provide security solutions and protect systems against attacks.
Thereby, the principals of the security of wireless communication systems are presented as
following.
1.1.1 Authentication and Non-reputation
The goal of authentication process is to confirm the identity of message transmitter. In gen-
eral, prior to any data transmission, mutual authentication between communicating parties is
required. Authentication via exclusive media access control (MAC) address is maybe the most
common technique in today’s networks. However, other layers may also be involved in the
authentication. For example, user name and password can be exploited as authentication tools
in the application layer [4]. Moreover, non-reputation is used to ensure that neither the source
nor the receiver of the message can deny communication occurrence. In this regard, digital
signatures are adopted where any node has its exclusive fingerprint which reveals its identity
[5].
1.1.2 Confidentiality and Access-control
The confidentiality strategies are set to protect the information from disclosure by illegitimate
entities. Primarily, cryptography and encryption techniques have been utilized in upper layers
of protocol stack to provide confidentiality. Recently, other methods such as cooperative jam-
ming have also been proposed to achieve this goal [4]. It must be pointed out that some attacks
aim at analyzing network traffic to obtain certain information, e.g., transmission frequency, or
spatial location of the nodes. Thus, access control mechanisms are employed to define a di-
verse level of access for different entities. Notably, because of broadcast characteristic of the
wireless medium there are many obstacles to provide a comprehensive access-control strategy
[5].
1.1.3 Data Integrity
Data integrity is to ensure that the received data has not been altered or modified during data
transmission. It is significantly important to detect any alternation or manipulation in the data
packets with the least amount of latency and false alarm rate. Man in the middle (MITM)
attacks may target the data integrity as they overhear the communication and they may set up
new communication routes and insert corrupted packets [4].
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Figure 1.1: Common wireless communication systems passive and active attacks
1.1.4 Availability
Ensuring that legitimate entities can access the network and have a robust communication is
termed availability [5]. For instance, denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks (i) may target the availability of a network, (ii) occupy the network resources;
and (iii) result in denial of service for authorized nodes.
Notably, the aforementioned security requirements (availability, authentication, non-reputation,
data integrity, confidentiality and access control) are complementary to secure wireless com-
munications. In other word, they must be provided simultaneously to ensure that the commu-
nication is secure.
1.2 Attacks Classification in Wireless communication Sys-
tems
In this section, attacks of wireless communication systems are classified based on their active
and passive behaviors, as seen in Fig. 1.1.
1.2.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks only monitor and analyze traffic. The main passive attacks are as following.
Passive Eavesdroppers
Passive wiretappers, also known as passive eavesdroppers, are a type of passive attacks which
overhear the communication while they are not capable of any alternation or modification of the
transmitted message [6]. The illegitimate nodes can overhear the communication and target the
confidentiality of the messages as seen in Fig. 1.2. This attacks is called passive eavesdropping
attack or wiretapping attacks in the literature.
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Figure 1.2: Wiretapping attack
Traffic Analyzers
Traffic analyzers are another group of passive attacks which do not make any modification in
the message, but they are able to reveal sensitive information by analyzing the traffic, e.g.,
transmission frequency, or spatial location of the communicating parties, or session length and
identities of source/receiver [5].
1.2.2 Active Attacks
Active attacks are a category of attacks which are capable of making modifications and changes
in messages. For example, they are able to delete a certain message and add to the other. The
most common active attacks are as follows.
Denial of Service Attacks
Some attacks try to use network resources so the network can no longer serve the authorized
nodes. This type of attacks are called denial of service attacks in the literature and they can
take place at different layers of the protocol stack. Distributed denial of service attacks are a
more severe type of DoS attacks. In DoS attacks, one device and one connection is exploited
by the attack to threat the victim. Whereas, in DDoS attacks, multiple devices, computers and
connections are exploited by the attack for threatening the victim node.
Message Modification
Message modification includes any change, alternation, deletion or addition of the original
message [5].
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Masquerade Attacks
There are cases in which illegitimate entity exploits a fake or forged identity so the network
considers it as an authorized entity and therefore it can misuse network resources [5]. This type
of attack is called masquerade attack in the literature.
1.3 Security Threats from OSI Layers Perspective
Examining current issues in wireless communication systems reveals that different security
threats are targeting different layers of communication systems. At this point, major security
threats of different layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI) are briefly reviewed.
• Physical layer is vulnerable to security issues due to the accessibility of wireless medium
by unauthorized entities. For example, eavesdropping attacks are one of the physical
layer attacks. In other cases, active attacks drop down the communication signal by
overwhelming the bandwidth via jamming signals. This attack is termed jamming attack
[5].
• In the context of the MAC layer attacks, there are attacks such as MAC spoofing and
MAC address theft which target the authentication procedure. Denial of service attacks
and man in the middle attacks may also target the MAC layer [7], [8]. In particular,
MITM attacks may be the active eavesdroppers and send the threat packets via setting up
connections to their victims, while the communicating parties are supposed to communi-
cate directly. Another group of MAC layer attacks generate numerous number of MAC
addresses per minute such that MAC address table of the victim device is overwhelmed
[9].
• IP spoofing, routing attack and packet sniffing are targeting the network layer. IP spoof-
ing can be via either forging or falsifying the packet’s IP addresses such that the receiver
cannot access the true IP address of the packet’s source. Routing attacks damage routing
protocol by: (i) eliminating certain routes, (ii) advertising routes to the nodes which does
not exist, (iii) updating the routing tables with faulty tables, etc. Moreover, packet sniff-
ing is a network layer attack which can access the confidential information via analyzing
network traffic [10], [11].
• Transport layer uses either transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram proto-
col (UDP). TCP is termed after a connection-oriented protocol in which the transmitter
can ensure the receipt of the message by the receiver via an acknowledge message. On
the contrary, UDP protocol is connectionless where the packets are only sent, and there-
fore, the transmitter cannot ensure about the reliability of the communication. How-
ever, UDP protocol has less latency and network overheads, compared to TCP protocol.
Flooding attacks can exploit the TCP protocol via sending numerous packets to a tar-
get and consuming the victim’s resources as the target receives the flooding packets and
needs to send the acknowledgement messages [12]. Similarly, flooding UDP packets
can threat the transport layer by sending a large number of UDP packets while target’s
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resources are consumed by the attack and cannot serve the legitimate nodes. Notably,
flooding attacks usually result in denial of service [13], [14].
• Regarding the application layer, viruses, worms and trojan horse are the most well-
known attacks. Technically speaking, a virus is attached to a program or a file and travels
from one device to the other once the user transfers files or installs programs. Viruses
spread the infections and the threats. Similarly, worms also travel from a device to an-
other, but the user is not involved. Trojan horse is a malicious software which initially is
seen as a helpful and interesting program to convince the user for installation. Blended
threats are a combination of viruses, worms and trojan horse attacks that cause severe
threats. DDoS are also a common application layer attack [15], [16].
Table 1.1 summarizes the common attacks of different layers of the OSI model.
Table 1.1: Layered overview of wireless systems attacks
OSI Layer Sample Attacks
Physical layer Wiretapping attack, jamming attack
MAC layer MAC address spoofing, identity theft, DoS, MITM, MAC flood
Network layer IP spoofing, routing attack, packet sniffing
Transport layer UDP flooding attacks, TCP flooding attacks, DoS
Application Layer Viruses, worms, Trojan horse, blended threats, DDoS attacks
1.4 Overview of Security Improvement:
From a Layered Networking Architecture Perspective
In this section, various security enhancement mechanisms from a layered networking architec-
ture perspective are reviewed. Herein, physical layer security is confined to a brief introduc-
tion whereas detailed technical discussion is referred to chapter 2. It is obvious that different
networking layers are threatened by security attacks and in today’s security enhancement ap-
proaches, most layers are involved. Such an approach mainly includes the upper layers of the
protocol stack, except the physical layer.
Only recently, there has been a growing interest in security enhancement techniques via
physical layer [17]. However different methods can be simultaneously used to achieve the most
promising results. For example, authentication of users can be realized via exploiting various
authentication methods such as MAC address authentication or plain password authentication.
On the other hand, a number of security methods have enhanced security through involvement
of multiple OSI layers. For instance, a secret key for cryptography purposes can be generated
based on the physical characteristics of the communication parties or the medium involved,
e.g., the reciprocal channel.
Cryptography techniques adopt primarily mathematical tools and secret keys to secure the
communication systems against illegitimate entities. The main objective of cryptography is
providing data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation through dif-
ferent networking layers. To this end, public and private key cryptography are introduced
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which are also, respectively, termed as asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography. In sym-
metric key cryptography, similar keys are adopted for encryption and decryption purposes.
Whereas, in asymmetric key cryptography, public key is exploited to encrypt a message and
the message can only be decrypted by the specific related private key [4]. Using initial upper-
layer cryptography techniques, one error in the received plain text results in plenty of errors in
the decrypted plain text. Thus, in more recent studies, advance encryption standard (AES) and
turbo coding are combined because turbo coding is capable of error correction. Cryptography
at physical layer can be through spread spectrum (SS) techniques which are further studied in
chapter 2.
The physical layer attack scenarios are mainly based on the existence of the eavesdropper
which tries to wiretap the transmission. In order to overcome this issue, friendly jamming,
information-theoretic security, beamforming and diversity techniques or combined methods
have been proposed in the literature. Jamming attacks are the other types of the threats to the
physical layer security and it has been suggested to use spread spectrum techniques to impair
them [18], [19]. More recent works have proposed authentication techniques which are based
on the physical layer approaches.
In the context of MAC layer and to prevent MAC flooding attack, it is possible to make
certain restrictions for each port in the sense of limiting the number of MAC addresses to be
received from each port. Another alternative solution is using fixed MAC Addresses although
this solution is not applicable in large scale networks [20], [21].
Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) and Wi-Fi protected access 2 (WPA2) are the two exten-
sively utilized authentication protocols in the networking layer. Furthermore, the second ver-
sion of Routing Information Protocol (RIP-V2) has been presented to prevent the a group of
routing attacks. In order to prevent packet sniffing, cryptographs techniques are used [20],
[21]. In addition, certain software and hardwares are already in the market as anti-sniffers
(e.g., Kitty-Litter The Anti-Sniffer)[22].
To secure the transport layer, transport layer security (TLS) and secure sockets layer (SSL)
have been utilized which in essence are cryptographic protocols to secure the transmission.
Username and password can be used in the application layer to enhance the security as it is very
common to have different user name and passwords for different applications and sometimes
an application requires multiple passwords.
1.5 Motivation of the Thesis
Cooperative communications via relay nodes has been considered as an interesting solution in
communication systems where reliable direct transmission between source and intended desti-
nation is not possible. The principle of cooperative communication reverts back to [23] where
capacity analysis of a two-hop communication system was devised. However, deployment of
relays in communication systems has been growing continuously and it has spread to Wimax
and cellular communications [24]. To be more precise, the standardizations of 3GPP LTE-
Advanced, IEEE 802.16j, and IEEE 802.16m already contain relay-based communications
[24].
Relaying communication is specified by cooperation strategies which is termed as re-
laying protocols in the literature, e.g., amplify-and forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF),
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compress-and-forward [24]. Many existing studies have compared the relaying strategies based
on reliability performance parameters [25]-[27]. Taking another point of view, some recent
works have studied cooperative communications from secrecy perspective [28]-[30]. Accord-
ingly, the notion of collaborative secrecy was introduced where the relays have the potential
to secure the communication. Following this idea, relays have been used as cooperative nodes
to improve the secrecy via performing different roles. Towards this goal, upper-layer security
techniques have been widely studied in the literature while physical layer techniques are com-
plementary schemes to obtain better results. For example, Multiple-input and multiple-output
(MIMO) relays are used to reduce the received SNR at the unauthorized entities [28],[31].
Herein, the focus of this thesis is on physical layer cooperative roles of the relays in order to
improve the security.
One of the main intuitions behind this work is that many communication entities such as
amplify-and-forward relays, repeaters and wireless sensor networks are not capable of han-
dling complex security methods due to their hardware limitations. Therefore, physical layer
security can be adopted in these systems to secure the communication. Moreover, in some
cases communication is only through lower layers of the protocol stack (e.g, communication
via repeaters). Thus, physical layer security flourish as a prominent security improvement
technique.
In the context of collaborative relaying, cooperative jamming has been widely studied
where relays can be utilized as temporary jammers to create intentional noise at the adversary
node to enhance security [32]-[34]. However, this technique has a number of disadvantages.
First, cooperative jamming strategies require additional node to generate the jamming which
is expensive in terms of hardware. Furthermore, conventional cooperative jamming strategies
increase the complexity since network overheads increase for the purpose of providing coordi-
nation between the helper and the main network. Hence, there is a need to provide alternative
solutions which overcome the aforementioned shortcomings.
1.6 Research Objectives
The objectives of the current work are summarized as below.
• The first goal includes the followings: (i) to comprehensively study the physical layer
security of cooperative communication systems in terms of security attacks, (ii) to in-
vestigate existing security improvement techniques, and (iii) to address advantages or
shortcoming of current solutions. This primary goal is a guide to further provide security
improvement schemes.
• The second objective is to provide a novel solution for two-hop communication systems
which rectifies the shortcomings of conventional cooperative jamming strategies.
• The third goal is to present a cost-effective and energy-efficient security enhancement so-
lution for multi-hop communication systems where power consumption and complexity
considerations are well noted.
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1.7 Contributions
Major contributions of this thesis, based on the proposed security solutions for cooperative
communication systems in chapter 3 and 4, are stated below.
• In chapter 3, a two-hop DF relaying systems is presented where communication takes
place in the presence of an external eavesdropper which can intercept the communica-
tions of both hops. Considering this system model the following results are obtained:
(i) A novel security solution is proposed which exploits the randomness of the channel
between the communicating parties and introduces a phase shift to the modulated data
such that the adversary node is not aware of it. It is proven that the proposed scheme can
increase the secrecy capacity of the system by degrading the received SNR at illegitimate
entities. (ii) Secrecy performance analysis of the system model is presented. (iii) It is
shown that increasing the transmit power can have harmful or helpful impact on secrecy,
depending on where the eavesdropper is located. For instance, it is demonstrated that if
the eavesdropper is an adjacent neighbor to the transmitter, raising the transmit power
results in more leakage of the signal to the illegitimate entity and therefore secrecy of the
system is degraded.
• In chapter 4, a multi-hop DF relaying system is considered where there exist multiple
non-colluding eavesdroppers. The contributions related to this system are stated at this
point: (i) Inspired by [35], a new way of using cooperative jamming is extended to the
aforementioned system to enhance the secrecy. In the proposed strategy, on the contrary
with traditional cooperative jamming, extra helper is not needed and the transmitter cre-
ates the intentional jamming. (ii) Secrecy performance of the aforementioned system
is analyzed. (iii) Power allocation strategies are presented to improve the security by
optimally allocating the power to the friendly jamming and the primary signal. It is illus-
trated that using the optimal power assignment boosts the ergodic secrecy capacity. (iv)
It is shown that diverse parameters impact the optimal power allocation factor among
which channel state information (CSI) of the adversary nodes must be noted particularly.
(v) Since accessing the CSI of the adversary nodes may not be feasible in many cases,
the sub-optimal solution is given which does not require the CSI of the adversary nodes.
The sub-optimal solution can be considered as close bound for the optimal solution if the
illegitimate entity is close to the transmitter.
1.8 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2, the importance and advantages of physical layer security are studied. Secrecy
performance criteria in the physical layer are introduced and defined in this chapter. Next,
Physical layer attacks are examined. Then, a literature survey on the earlier physical-layer secu-
rity strategies is provided where cooperative jamming, information-theoretic security, diversity,
beamforming and spread spectrum are reviewed. Later on this chapter, the study is focused on
a specific security case, where the relay node is not trusted but it is required to have the relaying
role. This chapter is finished with using the physical layer in practical wireless communication
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networks such as ad-hoc networks, cognitive radio networks, cellular networks, and wireless
sensor networks.
In chapter 3, secure communication in a two-hop communication system is investigated
where the relay employs decode-and-forward protocol. Analysis of secrecy performance of
the system model is presented where closed-form expressions of the probability of outage in
secrecy capacity and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity are calculated. Then, a random
phase shift scheme is presented which improves the secrecy capacity. Finally, simulation re-
sults are given which validate the theoretical contributions.
Chapter 4 is focused on the security of a multi-hop cooperative communication systems
where the relays adopt decode-and-forward strategy and there are multiple illegitimate wire-
tappers. First, the security analysis of the system model is given. Next, the new artificial noise
strategy is presented to degrade the received SNR at the illegitimate nodes, and increase the
secrecy. Due to particular importance of power allocation between the friendly noise and the
primary signal, power allocation solutions are proposed. Lastly, simulation results are pre-
sented to evaluate the capability of the proposed strategy to improve secrecy.
In chapter 5, the main conclusions of the thesis is summarized also potential directions for
future work are suggested.
Chapter 2
Physical Layer Security
Using the OSI model as a reference model, security measures to protect the user’s data nor-
mally takes place at the upper layers such as presentation layer. These security measures are
a family of various encryption techniques including symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.
The focus on upper layer security resulted in the abandonment of lower layer, physical layer,
security features [35]. However, a specified level of secrecy is needed in physical layer to
further utilize upper-layers security schemes [35]. Also, one cannot claim any contradictions
between employing the upper-layer and physical-layer security techniques. Therefore, differ-
ent layers security techniques can be adopted concurrently as they are complementary to each
other. Accordingly, the combination of different levels security solutions (such as physical
layer, network layer and link layer) have been investigated in recent studies [35]. In this regard,
the concept of cross-layer security has been used to indicate the aforementioned collaboration
of the layers for the purpose of security improvement [35], [36].
Physical layer security was pioneered in [37], [38] and [39]. However, more recently
the interest in physical layer security was revived in the 1990s [40]. Physical-layer security
schemes may be based on information theoretic techniques ([38], [41]-[42]), cooperative jam-
ming ([43]-[45]) or diversity and beamforming approaches ([46]-[48]). In addition, combining
multiple physical-layer security techniques have been used in the literature, e.g., using coop-
erative jamming and beamforming jointly to secure the communication [28]. In this chapter,
physical-layer secrecy performance criteria are defined. Next, physical layer eavesdropping
is examined. Finally, main existing security improvement approaches in physical layer for
cooperative relaying systems are investigated.
2.1 Secrecy Performance Parameters
In this section, the parameters of secrecy performance which are examined as the secrecy
criteria in the literature are introduced.
2.1.1 Secrecy Capacity
The fundamental metric of secrecy is termed secrecy capacity which is maximum achievable
secrecy rate of the system and reflects maximum transmission rate from source to desired des-
11
12 Chapter 2. Physical Layer Security
tination while eavesdropper is not able to access transmitted data and decode it. This definition
is formulated as the following [17, p. 62]
Cs = [Cm −Cw]+, (2.1)
where Cm is the capacity of the main link and Cw denotes the capacity of the illegitimate link
that are, respectively, defined by
Cm = log2(1 + γsd), (2.2)
Cw = log2(1 + γse), (2.3)
in which γsd and γsd denote the instantaneous received SNR at the intended receiver and the il-
legitimate entity, respectively. Therefore, based on equation (2.1), it can be said that increasing
the received SNR of the main link or decreasing the received SNR of the illegitimate link both
result in improving the secrecy capacity. Accordingly, security of the communication system
has been investigated considering instantaneous SNR of the legitimate and illegitimate links to
examine under which conditions positive secrecy capacity is achievable [49], [50].
2.1.2 Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
Probability of existence of a positive secrecy capacity, also termed as probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity, is an alternative secrecy performance parameter for communication over fad-
ing channels which is given by
Pr[Cs > 0] = Pr[Cm > Cw]. (2.4)
2.1.3 Probability of Outage in Secrecy Capacity
Probability of outage in secrecy capacity, (also known as secure outage probability, i.e., SOP)
indicates the likelihood of obtaining a target secrecy rate. SOP is one of the common secrecy
performance criteria for communication over fading channels when there is an eavesdropper to
intercept communication. This secrecy performance parameter is formulated as
Pout(Rt) = Pr[Cs < Rt], (2.5)
where Rt is the desired target secrecy rate. The outage in (2.5) can occur in any of the following
cases:
• Unreliable communication which is the case where the intended receiver cannot decode
a message.
• The eavesdropper is able to overhear a portion of the transmitted message.
It is worth saying that a new definition of secrecy outage has been recently pioneered in
[51]. The main concern of the authors of this work is that definition (2.5) takes into account
both reliability and security so any distinction between reliable communication and secure
transmission cannot be recognized. The authors believe that such a definition suffers from
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a shortcoming as the related outage questionably refers to the secrecy, and it may be due to
reliability issues. For example, if the channel between the source and the intended destination
is very weak, the transmitter is likely to delay the transmission. Considering definition (2.5),
this delay will be an outage whereas transmission has not occurred. To rectify this shortcoming,
the work presented in [51] has suggested another definition for the probability of outage in
secrecy capacity which is formulated as
Pout(Rt) = Pr[Cw > Rb − Rt|MessageTransmission], (2.6)
where Rb denotes transmission rate of the codewords. This new definition (2.6) has the follow-
ing advantages:
• It considers design parameters such as Rb.
• Unlike equation (2.5), in (2.6) message transmission is an initial condition of the secure
outage definition.
It must be pointed out that continuous transmission may happen in the case where the
transmitter is not aware of the destination’s channel. Herein, the outage can be formulated as
Pout(Rt) = Pr[Cw > Rb − Rt] [52]. On the other side, if the destination channel is available, the
transmitter is able to have a more proper design and to designate transmission or suspension
mode, in addition to choosing the appropriate transmission rate. The aforementioned design
can significantly enhance the security by degrading the probability of outage in secrecy ca-
pacity. However, SOP has been mentioned as a more worthwhile secrecy criteria compared to
secrecy capacity in the literature [53].
2.1.4 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
Ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) indicates the average of secrecy capacity and it is formulated
as [52]
Cs = E{Cs}. (2.7)
2.2 Multiple Eavesdroppers
Communication between source and destination can take place in the presence of an eaves-
dropper. In a more complicated case, as seen in Fig. 2.1, multiple eavesdroppers can overhear
the communication. Multiple eavesdropping can be studied under two categories explained as
below.
2.2.1 Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
In the case of non-colluding eavesdropping, there are multiple wiretappers to overhear the
communication and received SNR of the illegitimate link is assumed to be the maximum of the
received SNR of eavesdroppers. In other words, the illegitimate entities are mutually indepen-
dent. Therefore, the received SNR is denoted by [54], [55]
γe = maxMm=1γem , (2.8)
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Figure 2.1: Communication in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
where γem is the received SNR of the mth eavesdropper.
2.2.2 Colluding Eavesdroppers
In the case of colluding eavesdropping, there are multiple eavesdroppers to intercept the com-
munication and the received SNR of the illegitimate link is the summation of the received SNR
of eavesdroppers. Thus, the above relationship is reformulated as [56], [57]
γe =
∑M
m=1
γem . (2.9)
2.3 Active and Passive Eavesdropping
Physical layer attacks can be investigated considering the capabilities that are considered for
the illegitimate entities. Illegitimate nodes may have several goals. Initially, observing and
monitoring communication signal to overhear the main information is one goal pursued by the
attacks. From this stage forward, the attacks are categorized based on their active and passive
behaviors.
2.3.1 Passive Attacks in the Physical Layer
Passive eavesdroppers (also known as radio eavesdroppers) are capable of monitoring the sig-
nals to detect the main transmission, decode and analyze it. Although this group of attacks
are able to access the main transmission, they cannot interfere with the channel, and make any
changes or modifications. Since passive attacks are silent and they do not make any apparent
changes or modification, it is difficult to detect them.
2.3.2 Active Attacks in the Physical Layer
On the contrary, active attacks are capable of monitoring the transmission in addition to making
changes and modifications to the channels, nodes and communication sessions. For example,
active attacks can eliminate certain legitimate messages, modify the messages or insert faulty
messages. Researches in the field have focused on different capabilities of active attacks. The
authors of [58] considered the case where the active eavesdropper was a registered entity of
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a cellular network and it could send signaling messages to the base station. Jamming the
transmission between the source and the intended receiver via the eavesdropper was studied in
[59]. Secure transmission of TDD multicell multi-user massive MIMO systems was examined
in [31] where the eavesdroppers were active, and aimed at ruining channel estimation of the
legitimate nodes. In addition, DoS attacks can threaten the network though different layers of
the protocol stack including physical layer where the radio frequency jamming can jam the
main transmission; therefore, the network cannot serve the legitimate users [5].
Note that although active eavesdroppers can significantly reduce the secrecy performance of
communication systems but it is mostly easier to detect them, compared to the passive attacks,
due to the silent nature of passive attacks.
2.4 Physical Layer Security Techniques
In this section, different physical-layer security techniques and schemes are explained through
a classification that includes the following categories: information-theoretic security, beam-
forming techniques, artificial noise strategies, diversity approaches, coding techniques and ex-
ploiting channel characteristics for secrecy.
2.4.1 Information-theoretic Security
Wyner is a pioneer in the area of information-theoretic security due to his investigation of a
channel model in the existence of an eavesdropper. This channel model is also known as a
wiretap channel and is shown in Fig. 2.2 [37].
Wyner considered a discrete memoryless wire-tap channel where the information was trans-
mitted from a legitimate node (called Alice) to an intended receiver (called Bob). The commu-
nication occurred in the presence of an illegitimate entity (called Eve) which wiretapped the
channel between legitimate communication parties. The main goal is to maximize the trans-
mission rate from the transmitter to the destination such that leakage of the information to the
illegitimate entity is the least. Moreover, Shannon has first introduced the term of perfect se-
crecy in [38]. The results of these studies were later broadened to a Gaussian wire-tap channel
[39], and the term secrecy capacity was introduced.
It must be pointed out that secure communication over fading channels are significantly
important as they are helpful to analyze many practical scenarios [17]. To this end, communi-
cation over fading channels have attracted many researchers ( [50], [64]-[65]) as the channels
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Figure 2.3: Exploiting side information in BBWC.
vary over time and it is not always possible to have access to the instantaneous channel state
information (e.g., because of limited bandwidth [63]). Time-varying fading may limit the secu-
rity of wireless communication systems [60]. Thus, MIMO antennas and diversity techniques
were suggested to rectify this issue and enhance the secrecy [61], [62]. Also, the results of se-
cure communication over fading channels showed that , unlike communication over Gaussian
channels, a non-zero secrecy capacity is achievable even if the average SNR of the legitimate
link is less than the average SNR of the illegitimate link. The reason is because fading can
be beneficial in terms of secrecy such that instantaneous SNR of the main link is higher than
the instantaneous SNR of the illegitimate link [50]. Furthermore, illegitimate entities can be
equipped with multiple antennas to combat fading effects [61], [66].
In the year 1978, the authors of [36] have assumed a channel in which there were two
receivers indicated by receiver A and receiver B, and two message types as the following.
• Common message: to be received by receiver A and B.
• Confidential message: to be received only by receiver A.
This channel was called the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC), and since
then it has been the subject of interest for many researcher. Other works have made some
modifications in the aforementioned scenario and changed it to the case where there is one
confidential message per receiver [67].
Following this path work, secrecy in bidirectional wiretap channel (BBWC) was introduced
by the authors of [68]. This scenario in essence was a two-way communication system via
an intermediate DF relay in the presence of an illegitimate entity. In this scenario, Node A
intended to send the confidential message ma to the receiver B, and Node B intended to send
the confidential message mb to the receiver A, where there was an eavesdropper which could
overhear the communication. The intuition behind the presented approach is that each message
can be exploited only once as a secret key to decode the other message, as seen in Fig. 2.3.
In particular, the intermediate relay can encode the two messages using the XOR operator;
therefore, the coded message is given by [68]
m˜ = ma ⊗ mb. (2.10)
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The coded message m˜ is then sent to both receiver A and receiver B. Next, the receivers
apply their original messages, termed side information, to decode the received message. Ac-
cordingly, the received message at receiver A is given by
m˜ ⊗ ma = ma ⊗ mb ⊗ ma = mb, (2.11)
Similarly at receiver B, the message is as
m˜ ⊗ mb = mb ⊗ ma ⊗ mb = ma, (2.12)
Finally, it is concluded that each of the receivers securely attain their corresponding mes-
sage.
2.4.2 Secure Communication via Beamforming
Beamforming security approaches are based on a technique in which the main signal is sent in
the desired direction such that the destination signal strength is enhanced while the illegitimate
entity’s received SNR is minimized. Accordingly, the received SNR of the legitimate entity is
increased, but the the received SNR at the adversary node is degraded so the secrecy capacity
of the system is improved. The problem of optimal beamforming to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate in a dual-hop DF relaying system with the assumption of limited power constraints
was studied in [69]. This work has assumed that perfect channel state information is known
while this assumption is not applicable in many scenarios. Following this pathwork, the work
presented in [70] has devised the beamforming for a MIMO wiretap channel where only the
legitimate channels’ CSI is available, but the CSI of the illegitimate node is not known. This
work later extended its contributions to the sub-optimal solutions where the perfect CSI of the
main link even was not available and channel estimation error was involved.
2.4.3 Artificial Noise
Artificial noise (AN), also known as cooperative jamming (CJ), is based on an intentional
jamming signal created by legitimate helpers to confuse the eavesdropper. Consider Fig. 2.4,
where the source wants to communicate with the destination in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Because of the broadcast characteristic of radio propagation, the eavesdropper can wiretap the
main signal so the received SNR at the illegitimate node is given by
γse =
Ps | hse |2
σ2
, (2.13)
in which Ps indicates the transmit power of the source, hse is the channel from the source to the
eavesdropper and σ2 is the noise variance. Next, the controlled interference is created by the
jammer, denoted by J, to mislead the eavesdropper while the desired receiver is not affected by
the artificial noise. Accordingly, the eavesdropper received SNR is degraded as
γseAN =
Ps | hse |2
σ2 + P j | h je |2 , (2.14)
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where P j denotes the jamming power and h jse is the channel from the jammer to the eavesdrop-
per. Comparing equations (2.13) and (2.14) shows that received SNR at the illegitimate entity
is degraded. Hence, it can be concluded that secrecy capacity of the system is improved.
Artificial noise first was suggested in [71] to improve achievable secrecy of a communi-
cation system. This work showed that it is possible to obtain a positive secrecy capacity in a
communication system where the illegitimate entity is closer to the transmitter compared to
the intended receiver, via employing cooperative jamming. Following this framework, a num-
ber of cooperative jamming criteria including jamming coverage and jamming efficiency were
introduced in [6] , where the parameter ∆S OP is defined as
∆S OP =
S OPw/oAN
S OPAN
, (2.15)
in which S OPw/oAN and S OPAN , respectively, denote the probability of outage in secrecy ca-
pacity without and with using artificial noise. The intentional interference can be classified
into helpful and harmful jamming if ∆S OP ≥ 1.00 and ∆S OP ≤ 1.00, respectively. Us-
ing spatial sampling, jamming coverage is the total area of the helpful jamming. If a certain
two-dimensional area is denoted by A where the eavesdroppers can be located in (xe, ye) ∈ A,
jamming efficiency represents the average of ∆S OP(xe, ye). Moreover, jamming strategies for
the cases where the eavesdropper channel state information was or was not available were pre-
sented in [6]. The effect of using multiple jammers for the purpose of secrecy enhancement was
also investigated, and the results showed that jamming coverage and efficiency could increase
via using multiple jammers [6]. The same reference reported that increasing the transmit power
can be harmful in terms of secrecy due to the closeness of the adversary nodes to the legitimate
nodes. To be more specific, jamming close to the intended receiver needs accurate channel state
information which is not necessarily accessible. Although cooperative jamming is known as a
physical-layer security enhancement technique, the authors of [34] studied the effects of jam-
ming on secrecy from MAC layer prospective. This work introduced secure throughput notion
and presented jamming strategies where the objective was to enhance the jamming through-
put. The results showed that being aware of the location of the jammers are very helpful to
devise jamming protocols. As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, security enhancement
schemes may combine two or more physical-layer secrecy improvement techniques. In this
regard, beamforming and cooperative jamming can be employed concurrently to improve the
security [28], [73], [74].
The main concerns in cooperative jamming-based strategies are as following: (i) additional
power consumption due to generating friendly jamming, (ii) the requirement of the helper node,
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Figure 2.5: Source and destination with temporary jamming role.
and (iii) extra network overheads to coordinate between the main network and the jammer. At
this point, existing solutions for the aforementioned shortcomings are briefly studied.
Power Allocation Between Main Signal and Friendly Jamming
One of the main challenges toward employing artificial noise techniques is requirement of
additional power resources. To compensate this issue, power allocation between friendly jam-
ming and main signal has been studied in the literature such that the secrecy criterion (e.g.,
secrecy capacity) is maximized while power resources are limited [45], [72]. The authors of
[48] were the first to assume both the secrecy and the quality of service while using the coop-
erative jamming. They proposed a cooperative jamming scheme which minimized the received
signal-to-interference-and-noise (SINR) at the illegitimate entity in addition to ensuring a cer-
tain level of SINR at the legitimate receiver.
Artificial Noise by Source and Receiver
Requirement of an extra node as helper to generate the jamming signal is another disadvantage
of cooperative jamming strategies. Using the source and the receiver as temporary jammers for
creating and sending friendly jamming was proposed in recent studies to rectify this shortcom-
ing [73], [75].
In order to realize this methodology, the system model in Fig. 2.5 is employed where the
source, equipped with Ns antennas, intends to communicate with the destination, which has Nd
antennas, through a DF relay, with antennas Nr in the presence of an eavesdropper equipped
with Ne antennas. In the first hop of communication, from the source to the intermediate DF
relay, the receiver is used as a helper to generate the friendly interference and send it toward
the eavesdropper. Next, in the second hop of transmission, from the relay to the destination,
the source performs the jamming role to mislead the eavesdropper.
The authors of [28] have categorized artificial noise strategies of the aforementioned system
model to following two schemes:
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• Patrial cooperative jamming (PCJ): The transmitter and the destination send artificial
noise simultaneously.
• Full cooperative jamming (FCJ): The transmitter and the destination do not send the
intentional interference at the same time.
For example, in the fist hop of communication, the received signal at the relay and the
illegitimate entity are, respectively, given by
yr = Hsr(Tszs + T´sz´s) + HdrT´dz´d + nr, (2.16)
ye = Hse(Tszs + T´sz´s) + HdeT´dz´d + ne,1, (2.17)
where zi and z´i, respectively, stand for the main signal and the artificial noise sent by node i,
where i ∈ {s, d}. Also, Ti and T´i, respectively, indicate the beamformers of the main signal and
the artificial noise. Moreover, nr is the noise at the relay, and ne,1 is noise at the eavesdropper
after the first hop of transmission. If z´s , 0 and z´d , 0, it is termed as FCJ; otherwise, PCJ. The
results presented in [28] indicated that for the case in which the channel state information of the
eavesdropper was not known, FCJ secrecy performance outperformed the PCJ strategy. The
insightful work in [75], proposed a novel cooperative jamming strategy in which the intentional
interference was sent from the intended receiver. Remarkably, this strategy did not depend on
the channel state information of the receiver at the transmitter side. In addition, the proposed
scheme did not rely on the assumption that the number of eavesdropper’s antennas is less than
that of the intended receiver.
A New Way of Using Artificial Noise
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that conventional artificial noise strategies have a num-
ber of shortcoming as following. First the requirement of the helper is costly in terms of
hardware. Second, coordination between the helper and the original network is needed which
increases the network overheads significantly. Third, conventional artificial noise strategies are
usually limited to few applications. Such disadvantages have attracted researchers’ attention
to provide cost-effective and energy-efficient solutions, as the authors of [44] proposed a new
way of exploiting friendly jamming which rectifies the aforementioned disadvantages. Herein,
a dual-hop DF relaying system is considered in which the source aims to communicate with
the destination via a DF relay in the presence of an illegitimate entity, as shown in Fig. 2.6.
In this system model, the eavesdropper is able to receive signals from the first and the second
hops and employ maximal ratio combining (MRC) technique.
In this scheme, all terminals have single omni-directional antenna. It is assumed that com-
munication takes place in two phases only, i.e., direct link between the source and the destina-
tion does not exist. The transmitter of the first hop (source) or the second hop (DF relay) are
capable of assigning a portion of their power for generating friendly jamming. The intentional
noise is created based on a shared secret between communicating parties of the first or the
second hops which is not available at eavesdropper side.
This strategy have several interesting advantages comparing with traditional cooperative
jamming. First, extra hardware for the propose of jamming is not required. Second, system
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Figure 2.6: A new way of exploiting artificial noise.
complexity and network overheads are degraded as coordination between the additional node
and the main network is not necessary anymore. Third, conventional artificial noise strategies
are only applicable in few certain scenarios whereas the new approach can be utilized in more
practical cases. Once the desired receiver of the first hop (relay) or the second hop (destina-
tion) receives the signal because they have the knowledge about the intentional noise, artificial
jamming can be eliminated. On the contrary, the illegitimate entity does not have access to the
the intentional jamming. Accordingly, the intentional noise misleads the eavesdropper and the
received SNR of the adversary node is reduced. Based on the definition of secrecy capacity,
one approach to increase the maximum achievable secrecy rate is via reduction of the received
SNR at the illegitimate terminals. Thus, secrecy capacity of the system is improved.
Notably, proper power allocation in this approach have considerable effect on the perfor-
mance of the presented secrecy enhancement scheme. Thus, the authors of [44] have devised
an optimal power allocation in which the global channel state information including the CSI
of the eavesdroppers was available. It is obvious that in many practical scenarios, the channel
state information of the illegitimate nodes, or their statistics, are not accessible. Therefore,
sub-optimal solutions were provided in the same reference which did not rely on channel state
information of the eavesdropper.
2.4.4 Security Enhancement via Diversity Techniques
Primarily, diversity techniques were introduced to enhance the reliability of communication
systems. However, as indicated in [6], improving the received SNR at the intended destination
or degrading the received SNR at the adversary nodes, can enhance security. Thus, channel
diversity is a helpful technique which can result in secrecy enhancement [46]. Notably, di-
versity techniques are more energy-efficient, compared to the cooperative jamming strategies
because they do not require extra power resources. The following diversity approaches have
been exploited in the literature to improve the security.
Multi-antenna Diversity
If the global CSI (CSI of the main and the eavesdropper links) is available, secrecy of commu-
nication systems can be considerably enhanced by maximizing the received SNR at the desti-
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nation and minimizing the received SNR at the illegitimate entity. Consider a system model
where the source intends to communicate with the receiver via relays over Rayleigh fading
channels. The strategy proposed in [46] essentially was based on the definition of secrecy
capacity as Cs = [Cm − Cw]+, meaning that the capacity of the legitimate channel can be im-
proved by using diversity techniques. Accordingly, if Cr is increased, the total secrecy capacity
of the system is improved as well. The same reference recommended using MIMO or Virtual
MIMO in order to employ diversity techniques. In the case of virtual MIMO, multiple nodes
perform the relaying role such that the received SNR at the illegitimate entity is minimized. To
achieve this goal, the access control of the relays must be pre-set. Remarkable results of [46]
showed that even under very low SNRs, using diversity techniques can significantly improve
the achievable secrecy rate. It must be pointed out that in some practical scenarios, the channel
state information of the illegitimate nodes are not known. In the former case, the CSI of the
legitimate links are utilized such that the received SNR at the intended receiver is maximized;
therefore, secrecy capacity of the system is in turn increased.
Multiuser Diversity
Multiple access techniques (e.g., time devision multiple access, orthogonal frequency division
multiple access) are intensively utilized in multiuser communication system to communicate
with the end users. If global channel state information is available, the user channel assignment
and scheduling can be effectively done such that the capacity of the main channel is maximized
while the capacity of the eavesdropper link is minimized. On the other hand, if only the CSI of
the main link is available, the scheduling is optimized such that the capacity of the legitimate
channel is maximized. However, both of the aforementioned approaches improve the secrecy
capacity to a great extent [76].
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative diversity reverts back to relay selection schemes. In other words, the best relay
to perform the relaying role is chosen such that secrecy capacity of the system is maximized.
This approach is called relay selection with secrecy constraints in the literature. The aforemen-
tioned relay selection strategies are categorized examining that the CSI of the eavesdropper is
available or not.
Relay selection schemes have been widely investigated in recent works [77]-[80]. Previ-
ous relay selection strategies focus on reliability and performance parameters such as the link
strength as the main criterion to select the relay. To describe the relay selection schemes, a two-
hop DF relaying system, as seen in Fig. 2.7, is considered in which communication is carried
out in the presence of an eavesdropper. In traditional relay selection schemes, the illegitimate
link between the transmitters and the eavesdroppers is disregarded; thus, the instantaneous
SNR of the intended receiver is employed as a relay selection criterion. Hence, the selected
relay is chosen according to
r∗ = arg max{γri,D}, (2.18)
where r∗ denotes the selected relay and γri,D indicates the received SNR of the link between the
ith relay and destination. This relay selection strategy is appropriate to be used in communica-
tion environments where there is no wiretapper to overhear communication signals.
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Recently, an insightful work in [81] opened a new way of relay selection which is based
on secrecy constraints. This work took into account the link between the wiretapper and the
transmitter so the relay selection scheme with secrecy constraints has been updated as
r∗ = arg max{γri,D
γri,E
}, (2.19)
in which γri,E denotes the received SNR of the link between the ith relay and illegitimate entity.
Based on the achievable secrecy rate definition, this strategy aims at maximizing the achievable
secrecy rate of the considered system model. Furthermore, since in practice the instantaneous
received SNR of the illegitimate link is intractable, a sub-optimal solution was suggested as
well [81]. In particular, the sub-optimal solution was based on information about the average
channel statistics and it was formulated as
r∗ = arg max{ γri,D
σ2ri,E
}, (2.20)
where σ2ri,E represents an average knowledge about SNR of the link between the ith relay and
the illegitimate entity.
Following this framework, relay selection schemes under secrecy constraints have been
widely studied in the litrature [43], [81], [82]. An interesting work in [81], investigated a two-
hop DF relaying system in which source intended to communicate with the eavesdropper in the
presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. Consequently, the authors of [81] adopted
three relay selection strategies as below:
• The first scheme suggested that the relay had to be chosen such that instantaneous re-
ceived SNR at the illegitimate entity was minimized.
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• The second strategy was the conventional scheme where the eavesdropper link was not
included in relay selection procedure.
• In the third scheme, the maximum ratio of received SNRs of the main link to the illegit-
imate link is incorporated as the selection criteria.
In a more recent work [82], the relay selection was studied in a dual-hop communication
system where communications occured in the presence of an eavesdropper while the relays
could employ DF and AF protocols.
Relay Selection for Secure Communications with Artificial Noise
As previously mentioned in this chapter, artificial noise and relay selection are two techniques
for security enhancement in multi-hop relaying systems. Interestingly, in a recent work [43],
cooperative jamming and relay selection under secrecy constraints have been combined. In
this research, the authors initially proposed a relay selection strategy for a dual-hop DF relay-
ing communication system based on conventional relay selection strategies. Next, a relay was
chosen for the purpose of jamming and confusing the wiretappers. Using the proposed relay
selection schemes jointly, enhanced the security of the communication system. This work fur-
ther devised relay selection strategy for the case where instantaneous channel state information
of the illegitimate node was not available.
On the other hand, communication in a wiretap channel in the existence of a helper which
can perform either relaying role or jamming role was studied in [83]. This study aimed at
answering the question that under different conditions the helper had to perform a relaying or
the jamming role in order to improve system secrecy. Therefore, the following two scenarios
were investigated over path-loss and fading channels: (i) direct transmission with artificial
noise, (ii) dual-hop transmission via relay.
2.4.5 Exploiting Channel Characteristics for Secrecy
Security improvement in physical layer can be achieved via using the channel characteristics.
In this regard, different schemes have been proposed including generating the secret key based
on the channel between the communicating parties, MIMO diversity and RF finger print. Since
MIMO diversity have already been studied in this chapter, hereon other two methods are briefly
examined.
Creating the Secret Key
A shared secret key between communicating nodes can be created via using the channel be-
tween the source and the intended receiver. The idea essentially comes from the fact that the
channel between the communicating parties is not accessible to the illegitimate entities [84]-
[86]. The authors of [85] have used this intuition to create a secret key. In this study the
channel between the source and the intended receiver and the channel between the receiver and
the source were assumed identical. Herein, each communicating party generated a secret key
according to the reciprocal channel independently. Next, the communicating parties started a
handshaking under secure conditions. If the secret keys were the same, they would be used for
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security improvement for example via cryptography techniques; otherwise, the communicating
parties had to start from the beginning of the procedure via another channel estimation [85].
RF Fingerprint
Primarily, most authentication and digital signature techniques have been used in upper layer
of networking stack. However, a new trend towards using physical layer authentication has
recently started where the transmitters are identified via their unique transmission character-
istics [87]-[89]. This new authentication scheme is called RF fingerprint in the literature. In
this regard, it has been suggested in [89] to use the channel response in order to differentiate
between the legitimate and illegitimate entities and to verify if recent and previous messages
were sent by the same node or not.
2.4.6 Security Enhancement via Exploiting Coding
Spread spectrum has been introduced as a coding technique to secure the communication in
physical layer [5]. In spread spectrum techniques, the main signal is intentionally spread
through a wide frequency bandwidth to secure it from eavesdropping, jamming, and etc. In
this respect, frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) is one of the proposed techniques in
which the carrier’s frequency changes frequently such that the unauthorized entity cannot ac-
cess the carrier. Moreover, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) is another technique in
which the main signal is split to subsignals using pseudo noise (PN). The split signals are later
transmitted over separate frequencies, and therefore the illegitimate nodes which do not have
access to the frequency hopping pattern (FHP) cannot retrieve the main signal [5]. Spread spec-
trum techniques require smaller keys, compared to the upper-layer cryptography techniques.
On the other hand, spread spectrum techniques increase the required bandwidth. Notably, the
aforementioned techniques are effective solutions to mitigate jamming and physical layer DoS
attacks.
2.5 Securing the Transmission via Untrusted Relays
The security scenarios are not only the cases where the eavesdroppers are external nodes. In-
deed, there are cases in which communication between the source and destination may only be
available through untrusted relays [35], [53], [72]. The authors of [90] and [91] have inves-
tigated the security in dual-hop communication system where the relays are untrusted. Inter-
estingly, the results showed that for non-regenerative relays, including AF relays, achieving a
positive secrecy rate is possible while for the DF relays these results are not applicable. There
have been different approaches toward secure communication in networks where relays are
untrusted. Hereon, some of the relevant approaches are briefly reviewed.
2.5.1 Securing the Transmission via Untrusted Relays Using Coding
Secure transmission over a multi-hop communication system was studied in [92] where direct
link between source and destination did not exist and intermediate nodes were untrusted. In this
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paradigm, it was presumed that each node could only communicate with its adjacent neighbors
and the intermediate nodes were employed for relaying. However, the results of this work
implied that secure transmission between the source and the destination, despite cooperation
of untrusted relays for relaying proposes, is achievable. This work focused on employing
compute-and-forward protocol at the relays and using nested lattice codes.
2.5.2 Securing the Transmission via Untrusted Relays Using Cooperative
Jamming
Another proposed strategy in existing studies to secure the communications through untrusted
relays is cooperative jamming as proposed in [53]. The authors of [93] have presented a cooper-
ative jamming strategy and corresponding secrecy performance analysis. Thereon, to examine
this methodology in detail, a two-hop AF relaying system is considered where there is not any
direct link between the source and the destination, and transmission from the source to the relay
is realized in two phases. In the first hop of communication, as observed in Fig. 2.8, the source
sends the main signal toward the untrusted AF relay while the destination sends an intentional
jamming signal simultaneously toward the untrusted relay. Therefore, the received signal at
the relay is given by
yr =
√
ρPthsr xs+
√
(1 − ρ)Pthdr x´ j + nr, (2.21)
where the total transmission power of each hop is set to Pt and ρ indicates the power allocation
factor between the original signal, denoted by xs, and the jamming signal, denoted by x´ j and
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ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Herein, the total power is obtained as
Pt = Ps + P j (2.22)
in which Ps and P j are the source and the jamming signal power values. The AF relay is not
able to distinguish and spilt the main signal and the intentional noise. Therefore, it performs the
relaying role without accessing the main transmission, as seen in Fig. 2.9. Hence, the received
signal at the destination is formulated as
yd = βhrd(
√
ρPthsr xs+
√
(1 − ρ)Pthdr x´ j + nr) + nd, (2.23)
in which it is assumed that the AF relay uses β as its amplification factor such that the sent
signal by the relay is originally given by
xr = βyr, (2.24)
Note that since the intentional interference was originally sent by the receiver, jamming
signal is known and so can be removed at the intended receiver’s side. Using equation (2.23),
the received signal is retrieved as
y´d = βhrd(
√
ρPthsr xs + nr) + nd, (2.25)
The performance of this strategy is influenced by a number of factors. Most importantly,
the power allocation between the main transmission and the intentional noise can affect the
results significantly [93]. To clarify the effect of ρ, a single AF relay communication system
was considered in which associated simulation parameters are listed in the following table.
Table 2.1: Simulation set up parameters (untrusted relay)
Simulation Parameter Value
Source location (0,0) m
Untrusted relay location (500,0) m
Destination location (1000,0) m
Path loss coefficient 3.5
σ2 -60 dBm
The Monte carlo simulations are corresponding to an average of 105 independent trials.
The results in Fig. 2.10 show that a proper power allocation is necessary to ensure that secrecy
of the system is improved.
The importance of power allocation between the main signal and the artificial noise has
motivated researchers in the field [72]. Herein, the authors of [72] studied ergodic secrecy
capacity of a two-hop AF relaying system where the relays were untrusted. Further, it was in-
vestigated that how large-scale antenna arrays at the source or the intended receiver could affect
the secrecy performance of this system. The results showed that if the source was equipped
with large scale antennas, ergodic secrecy capacity only depended on the channel between the
untrusted relay and the intended receiver. On the other hand, if the legitimate receiver had large
antenna arrays, ergodic secrecy capacity only relied on the channel between the source and the
untrusted intermediate relay.
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Figure 2.10: Impact of power allocation on ESC.
2.5.3 Securing Transmission via Untrusted Relays Using Cross-layer Ap-
proaches
If communication between source and intended receiver is only possible through untrusted
relays, it is possible to secure the communication via distributing the relaying node among
untruted non-collaborative relays [35]. In other words, for the source to be able to communicate
with the destination, intermediate relays must perform relaying role which requires to reduce
the access of each intermediate node to the entire communication.
It can be said that whenever relay R∗ is transmitting, other relays are presumed as potential
eavesdroppers. Therefore, by distributing the relaying role among different intermediate nodes,
as seen in Fig. 2.11, the physical layer security can be improved. To be more precise, if the
desired transmission rate from the source to the legitimate receiver is Rt, the entire data stream
is divided to m data streams represented by l1, l2, ..., lm where associated transmission rates are
given by R1,R2, ...,Rm so Rt can be written as
Rt =
∑m
i=1
Ri, (2.26)
The authors of [35] suggested that data streams among intermediate nodes were distributed
using beamforming techniques in order to minimize the access of each of intermediate entities
to the entire data. Further, it was proposed to use an upper-layer security strategy via sharing
the secret key to compliment the aforementioned scheme [68]. This study showed that for the
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Figure 2.11: Distributing the data stream between the intermediate untrusted relays.
AF protocol, perfect information-theoretic secrecy is attainable while for the DF protocol these
results are not valid. However, still for DF relays date distributing can improve the security to
some extent.
2.5.4 Securing the Transmission via Untrusted Relays Using Beamform-
ing
Beamforming techniques can be employed to secure the communication via untrusted relays.
A two-hop AF MIMO relaying system was considered in [94] where AF relay was not trusted
so had the potential to be a passive eavesdropper. Thereby, two communication scenarios were
employed as follows.
• Non-collaborative scheme in which the intermediate node is considered as an external
passive node while not performing the relaying role
• Collaborative scheme in which the untrusted relay retransmits the main signal using joint
beamforming at the source and the relay [94]
Interestingly, the results showed that if the SNRs of source-relay link and relay-destination
links were low, then the collaborative scheme outperformed better in terms of achievable se-
crecy rate. Moreover, the authors have shown that the aforementioned schemes lead to more
secure communications in terms of secrecy capacity compared to the traditional beamforming
strategies.
2.6 Secure Transmission with Buffer-aided Relays
Conventional relays have pre-scheduled role assignments where there is a switching between
receive and transmit modes. Recent works have proposed a new relaying protocols known
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as buffer-aided relays where the relays are equipped with buffers while providing dynamic
smart switching between the receive and transmit modes [95]-[97]. It has been proved that
the introduced diversity degree has many benefits such as increasing the throughput as well
as diversity gain, and signal-to-noise ratio [98], [99]. However, one of the disadvantages of
buffed-aided relays is latency caused by data buffering. Interestingly, the potential advantages
of adopting buffer-aided relays in terms of physical layer security was not investigated, until
it was shown in [100] and [101] that adopting buffer-aided relays can improve physical layer
security.
To be more specific, a two-hop communication system was considered in [100] in which all
nodes were half-duplex and communication took place in the presence of an illegitimate entity
which could wiretap the transmission of the second hop, as seen in Fig. 2.12. Moreover, it was
assumed that the relay was equipped with a buffer, and different relay selection strategies were
studied according to efficiency and security of both hops. This work investigated two cases
where the channel state information of the destination is available or not. The results revealed
that there is a considerable improvement in the security of the buffer-aided relay scenarios
compared to the case that the relays are incapable of storing the data. However, the assumption
that the eavesdropper and the destination were in the same cluster and the eavesdropper could
only overhear the communication of the second hop is the limitation of this scheme.
2.7 Practical Scenarios of Physical Layer Security
In this section, the capabilities of physical-layer security techniques in some practical scenarios
are studied. Broadcast channel with confidential message in the presence of an eavesdropper is
an applicable scenario where legitimate and illegitimate entities have arbitrary locations [67]-
[68]. However, physical layer security can be adopted in other scenarios partly explained in
the following subsections.
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2.7.1 Physical Layer Security in Ad-hoc Networks
The notion of secrecy transmission capacity has been introduced in [102] in order to specify
the relevance of physical-layer security requirements and throughput of large-scale ad-hoc net-
works. As a contribution, it was shown that a moderate security level could be obtained via a
relatively low throughput cost. On the other hand, a high security level is indeed costly in terms
of throughput cost. Further results illustrated that through the use of cooperative jamming tech-
niques, a high level of security at a lower throughput cost could be achieved. However, this
method is solely applicable to a single-hop case while multi-hop scenarios are widely present
in today’s wireless communication systems.
2.7.2 Physical Layer Security in WSNs
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) extensively expose eavesdropping. Cryptography security
enhancement techniques have been already investigated in WSNs. But, the limitations of
WSNs in terms of computation load and energy level have led to research efforts aiming at
reducing complexity and energy consumption [32], [103]. According to the results, secrecy
of WSNs can be significantly improved via physical-layer security techniques while less com-
plexity and energy consumption are involved. In addition, it was shown that friendly jamming
could enhance the security of WSNs [32].
2.7.3 Physical Layer Security in CRNs
Cognitive radio network (CRN) adopts an efficient way to exploit the spectrum such that the
licensed spectrum is opportunistically borrowed by secondary entities, if the main user does
not need it. However, CRNs introduce some security vulnerabilities in the physical layer sum-
marized as below[104]:
• The secondary users must be able to differentiate the primary user and the illegitimate
nodes.
• The accuracy of sensing information at the secondary entity affects its decisions and
expose attacks.
In addition to the common eavesdropping and jamming attacks, physical layer of cognitive
radio networks expose other attacks. First, primary user emulation (PUE) attack masquerades
the main user, and exploits the licensed band. Therefore, the secondary entities cannot use the
band. Second, objective function attack which threatens the learning engine of CRNs whose
role is to adjust various parameters of the system and maximize the objective function. Third
group of attacks are learning attack (LA) where the illegitimate entities send faulty information
to the learning radio. Finally, Byzantine attack which injects wrong information in the spectrum
sensing data so spectrum access decision cannot be accurate [104]. Furthermore, security
solutions for the aforementioned attacks are presented in [104].
Moreover, the physical layer security of a CRN in the existence of multiple wiretappers
was investigated in [105]. This work has presented a multiuser scheduling scheme to enhance
security in communication systems against wiretappers. The results showed that the newly
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presented scheme had better performance in terms of achievable secrecy rate compared to the
conventional multiuser scheduling protocols.
2.7.4 Physical Layer Security in Cellular Networks
The majority of initial studies in physical layer are related to point-to-point scenarios or the
cases where the isolated cells are considered. However, in order to adopt physical layer se-
curity in cellular networks, their impact on large-scale networks must be examined. In this
regard, the authors of [106] considered a large-scale cellular network where base station and
the user equipment (UE) were independently placed and Poisson point processes were used
to model their spatial locations. This study reported that the best BS in terms of secrecy was
not necessarily the closest one to the user. In addition, the availability of the spatial location
of illegitimate users at the BS significantly improved the secrecy. A single antenna case was
studied in [106] where certain nodes had the potential to be eavesdroppers while a recent work
investigated a more general case in which the nodes were equipped with multiple antennas,
and each node could act as an eavesdropper except the communicating parties. It was shown
that optimal density of the base stations could be devised such that the mean secrecy rate of the
system was maximized [107].
Table 2.2: An overview of physical-layer security techniques
Physical Layer Security
Technique
Prevented Attack Corresponding Security
Concern
Information-theoretic Eavesdropping Confidentiality
Beamforming Eavesdropping Confidentiality
Diversity Eavesdropping Confidentiality
Artificial noise Eavesdropping Confidentiality
Spread spectrum Eavesdropping, jam-
ming, traffic analysis
Availability, confidential-
ity
Fingerprint Eavesdropping, masquer-
ade, misusing resources
Authentication, confiden-
tiality
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, physical layer security was introduced and discussed. It was pointed out that the
physical-layer security techniques and the upper-layer security strategies were complimentary
and could be exploited simultaneously to provide secure communications. The definitions and
formulations of the main secrecy performance parameters including secrecy capacity, ergodic
secrecy capacity, probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and probability of outage in secrecy
capacity were described. Later, communication in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was
examined, and the eavesdroppers were categorized to passive and active wiretappers based on
their capabilities to make changes or modifications in the main signal. It was also highlighted
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that multiple eavesdroppers could be colluding or non-colluding in the sense that they could or
could not collaborate for the purpose of reducing secrecy.
Next, different physical-layer security techniques were explained with details which in-
cluded information-theoretic, beamforming, artificial noise and diversity techniques. Follow-
ing this framework, combination of different security techniques was proposed which included
the combination of beamforming techniques and artificial noise or the artificial noise and relay
selection.
Moreover, communication via untrusted relays was examined and several approaches to-
ward achieving positive secrecy rate in such scenarios were investigated. Also, the advantages
of using buffer-aided relays in terms of secrecy in physical layer was briefly studied. In addi-
tion, the capabilities of physical layer security in applicable scenarios including WSNs, CRNs,
cellular networks and ad-hoc networks were highlighted in brief. Finally, an overview of exist-
ing physical-layer security schemes was presented in Table 2.2.
Chapter 3
Secrecy Enhancement in Two-hop DF
Relaying Systems
Cooperative wireless communications via relays have been widely used to reduce energy con-
sumption and enhance coverage and quality of service. However, the broadcast nature of wire-
less medium, introduces the security risks to the wireless relaying system. Therefore, security
and reliability of the cooperative communication systems are needed simultaneously to meet
the growing demand of secure wireless communications.
Since two-hop relaying systems are expected to be extensively utilized in the future com-
munication systems, security of a two-hop relaying system is investigated in this chapter. For
example, the long term evolution (LTE)-advanced cellular systems has presently recommended
two-hop relaying as a technique to increase the coverage and mitigate the issues of cell edge
for the cases when the end user is located far from the base station [112]. Relaying commu-
nications can be achieved through different protocols. Amplify-and-forward and decode-and-
forward protocols are the most common protocols applied at the relays [108]. Processing time
and complexity of AF relays are less, relative to DF relays, but DF relays are more robust
in low to medium signal-to noise ratios (SNR) [109]-[111]. In this chapter we focus on DF
strategy. In order to mitigate security risks, cooperative relaying has been investigated through
different aspects among which friendly jamming must be mentioned. However, cooperative
jamming mostly required additional helper and increases the network overheads. Thus, this
chapter aims at providing alternative security solutions.
3.1 Introduction
Many existing works at physical layer security exploit conventional cooperative jamming to
enhance the security [28]-[29] ,[113]. Classical cooperative jamming needs an extra helper
(other than the communicating parties) to generate the jamming signal, so it is costly in terms
of hardware. In addition, the coordination between the jammer and the main network raises the
network overheads. Therefore, there is a need for cost-effective and energy-efficient solutions.
Herein, a novel security improvement scheme is presented in which a random phase shift is
applied to the modulated data of each hop of transmission. The random phase shift is created
based on a shared information between communicating entities which is not available at the
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eavesdropper. Thus, the desired receiver is aware of the random phase shift and it can remove
the phase shift and obtain the main signal, whereas the illegitimate node does not have access
to the injected phase shift. This modification results in confusing the illegitimate nodes so
the received SNR at the eavesdropper is degraded and the secrecy capacity of the system is
improved. As it was mentioned, the random phase shift must be created using a shared knowl-
edge between the communicating entities. For example the reciprocal channel between the
transmitter and the intended receiver can be exploited to create the random phase shift because
the illegitimate node does not have access to this channel.
It is noteworthy that due to the readily accessible channel information, the complexity
of the presented secrecy improvement scheme is not high. Notably, the proposed scheme is
cost-effective and it can be applied to the communication systems in which power resources
are limited. The work presented in [114] is one of the first attempts to improve the secrecy via
using the relays. Different approaches have targeted the secrecy of relaying systems to improve
the security. Hereon, the most important recent works on the security of two-hop cooperative
relaying networks are summarized as below.
In relaying systems initially, relay selections strategies have been proposed, considering the
performance and reliability criteria. The study presented in [81] opened up a new aspect, as it
concentrated on relay selection under secrecy performance parameters. This work considered
the illegitimate link in the relay selection procedure and it aimed at maximizing the secrecy
capacity. Following this framework, relay selection with secrecy constraints in the presence of
an eavesdropper was studied in [115]. In the context of secure transmission with cooperative
helpers, cooperative beamforming was investigated in [30] and [47].
On the other hand, although jamming initially is unwagnted, cooperative jamming has been
introduced as a promising technique to improve the security of wireless communication sys-
tems where an intentional jamming can degrade the received SNR at the eavesdropper and
enhance the secrecy. The jamming signals can be sent from different entities including source,
relay, receiver or an extra node [113],[116]. In order to ensure that this strategy enhances the
secrecy and it does not interfere the main signal transmission, power allocation between the
original signal and the jamming is required. Thus, some recent works have focused on opti-
mal and sub-optimal solutions of power allocation [44], [45]. In this regard, the work in [83]
studied secure communication between a source and destination with a helper, and it explained
when the helper had to jam and when it had to relay in order to achieve the best performance in
terms of secrecy. The authors of [43] chose one helper among a group of available cooperative
intermediate nodes to perfume the relaying role and transmit the data to the intended receiver.
Next, the second helper was selected to generate the friendly jamming at the eavesdropper.
Moreover, the authors of [28] presented an interesting security enhancement strategy, based
on cooperative jamming, for a dual-hop DF relaying system in the presence of an illegitimate
node. However, it must be pointed out that in cooperative jamming, the coordination between
the nodes results in a complexity which has to be avoided. Furthermore, the power consumption
of the aforementioned strategy is considerable. Therefore, this chapter provides an alternative
cost-effective solution, in terms of both energy consumption and complexity for two-hop DF
relaying systems.
The problem of generating a shared secret according to a common information between the
transmitter and intended receiver has been investigated in existing studies where the channel
reciprocity is exploited to generate the secret key [86], [117]. However, most current ap-
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Figure 3.1: Two-hop communication system model.
proaches suggest using the generated key in cryptography algorithms. Hereupon, this chapter
proposes a novel scheme to utilize the shared secret via an energy-efficient and less complex
approach through physical layer. In principle, it is suggested to use a shared secret for the mod-
ification at the transmitter where the authorized receiver can detect the modification as it has
access to the secret key. On the other hand, the adversary is not aware of the key and therefore
its received SNR is decreased and the secrecy capacity of the system is improved.
3.2 System Model
Consider a two-hop decode-and-forward relay system, as shown in Figure 3.1. The system
consists of a source node S , DF relay R, intended receiver D and an illegitimate node E. It
is assumed that the source has no direct link with the destination and the communication is
carried out through the DF relay and in two hops. The first hop is from the source to the DF
relay and the second hop performs the transmission from the relay to the intended receiver. The
eavesdropper is able to overhear the communication signals of both hops, and to utilize MRC
to combine the received signals from the source and the relay. All nodes in this system model
are half-duplex meaning that they can receive or transmit the signal at a time.
Channels between nodes i and j are Rayleigh fading and denoted by hi j where i, j ∈
{s, r, d, e}. The channel fading coefficients are presumed to be constant during the transmission
of each codeword but they are subject to independent and random changes once the codeword
changes. It is also considered that the channel fading coefficients related to each two pair of
nodes are independent. In addition, γi j represents SNR of i j link e.g., γsr denotes the SNR of
S − R link.
The instantaneous received SNR of the relay at the first hop is given by
γsr =
PS | hsr |2
σ2
, (3.1)
where PS denotes the transmit power of the source and σ2 represents variance of the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) of all terminals. Similarly, the instantaneous received SNR of
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the eavesdropper at the first hop can be written as
γse =
PS | hse |2
σ2
. (3.2)
Since the fading coefficients are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable, it can be con-
cluded that γi j have exponential distribution. Hence, Probability density function (PDF) and
cumulative density function (CDF) of γsr are, respectively, written as [118, p. 188]
pγsr (γ) =
1
γsr
exp(− γ
γsr
), (3.3)
Pγsr (γ) = 1 − exp(−
γ
γsr
), (3.4)
in which γsr is the averaged received SNR of the relay at the first hop and it is expressed by
γsr =
PS E{| hsr |2}
σ2
, (3.5)
All over the formulations, E{.} indicates the expectation of a random variable. Also, the instan-
taneous received SNR of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper in the second phase are,
respectively, given by
γrd =
PR | hrd |2
σ2
, (3.6)
γre =
PR | hre |2
σ2
, (3.7)
in which PR represents the transmission power of the relay and CDF and PDF of γrd are,
respectively, formulated as
pγrd (γ) =
1
γrd
exp(− γ
γrd
), (3.8)
Pγrd (γ) = 1 − exp(−
γ
γrd
). (3.9)
Hereon, γrd represents the averaged received SNR of the second phase and it is expressed by
γrd =
PRE{| hrd |2}
σ2
. (3.10)
3.3 Secrecy Performance
In this section, the secrecy performance of the system model is studied and closed-form expres-
sions of probability of outage in secrecy capacity and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
are calculated. These secrecy analysis facilitate the realization of the security issues and it is a
guide to develop security improvement schemes.
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3.3.1 Secrecy Capacity
As mentioned in chapter 2, secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum transmission rate from
the source to the intended receiver where the data is not accessible for the illegitimate nodes.
Thus, it can be written as
Cs = [Cr −Ce]+, (3.11)
In this notation, Cr is the capacity through the main link and Ce represents the capacity of
the illegitimate link. Moreover, [x]+ is defined as
[x]+ ,
{
0 x ≤ 0
x 0 < x .
Capacity of the main link is given by [119]
Cr =
1
2
min{log2(1 + γsr), log2(1 + γrd)}, (3.12)
in which 1/2 is due to the fact that signal transmission is in two phases. In this system model,
it has been assumed that the eavesdropper is able to combine the receives SNRs from different
hops and it is capable of joint decoding. Thus, capacity of the eavesdropper link is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2(1 + γse + γre). (3.13)
In order to facilitate the secrecy performance derivations, parameters γT , γE and γS are
defined as following.
γT , min {γsr, γrd}, (3.14)
γE , γse + γre, (3.15)
γS ,
1 + γT
1 + γE
. (3.16)
Using these definitions, secrecy capacity of this system model is formulated as
Cs =
1
2
[log2
1 + γT
1 + γE
]+ =
1
2
[log2γs]+. (3.17)
3.3.2 Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
It has been explained in chapter 2 that probability of existence of secrecy capacity refers to the
case where the main channel capacity is stronger than the capacity of the illegitimate channel.
Thus, probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of this system model can be expressed as
Pr[Cs > 0] = Pr[
1 + γT
1 + γE
> 1]
= Pr[γS > 1]
= 1 − PγS (1),
(3.18)
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where PγS (.) represents CDF of γS . Equation (3.18) is a closed-form expression for the prob-
ability of non-zero secrecy capacity in this system model. At this point PγS (.) is derived to
utilize it for secrecy performance analysis of this work. CDF of γS is given by
PγS (γ) = Pr[
1 + γT
1 + γE
< γ]. (3.19)
Therefore, (3.19) can be expressed as
PγS (γ) = Pr[γT < γ(1 + γE) − 1]
=
∫ ∞
0
PγT (γ(1 + γe) − 1)pγE (γe)dγe.
(3.20)
As it is seen in (3.20), it is needed to derive CDF of γT and PDF of γE to obtain the closed-
form expression of PγS (.).
Derivation of CDF of γT :
First CDF of γT is calculated as the following. Using (3.14) it can be written that
PγT (γ) = Pr[min(γsr, γrd) < γ]
= 1 − Pr[γsr > γ, γrd > γ]. (3.21)
The obvious fact that γsr and γrd are independent results in
PγT (γ) = 1 − Pr[γsr > γ]Pr[γrd > γ]
= 1 − (1 − Pγsr (γ))(1 − Pγrd (γ)).
(3.22)
Invoking (3.4) and (3.9) in (3.22), it can be written that
PγT (γ) = 1 − exp(−
γ
γsr
)exp(− γ
γrd
)
= 1 − exp(−γβ),
(3.23)
in which β is given by
β ,
1
γsr
+
1
γrd
, (3.24)
Using (3.24) PDF of γT is derived as
pγT (γ) = βexp(−γβ). (3.25)
Derivation of PDF of γE:
At this point, it is needed to derive PDF of γE. Since the received SNR of the eavesdropper
at the first and second hop are exponentially distributed, related PDFs can be written as
pγse(γ) =
1
γse
exp(
−γ
γse
), (3.26)
pγre(γ) =
1
γre
exp(
−γ
γre
), (3.27)
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in which the average received SNRs of the eavesdropper is the first and second hop are respec-
tively, given by
γse =
PS E{| hse |2}
σ2
, (3.28)
γre =
PRE{| hre |2}
σ2
, (3.29)
Using the fact that γse and γre are independent, if γ > 0, CDF of γE is given by [120, Sec. 6-45]
PγE (γ) = 1 + θ[γreexp(
−γ
γre
) − γseexp(−γ
γse
)], (3.30)
where θ is defined as
θ ,
1
γse − γre . (3.31)
Hence, PDF of γE is expressed by
pγE (γ) = θ[exp(
−γ
γse
) − exp(−γ
γre
)]. (3.32)
Derivation of CDF of γS :
Using (3.23) and (3.48) in (3.20) results in [121, Sec. 3.310]
PγS (γ) = 1 − θ[
1
βγ + 1
γse
− 1
βγ + 1
γre
]exp(β − βγ). (3.33)
3.3.3 Probability of Outage in Secrecy Capacity
The probability that instantaneous secrecy capacity of this system is lower than a target secrecy
rate, Rs refers to the probability of outage in secrecy capacity and it can be written as
Pout(Rs) = Pr[Cs < Rs]. (3.34)
Using the total probability theorem results in [120, eq. (2-41)], [50]
Pout(Rs) = Pr[Cs < Rs|γT > γE]Pr[γT > γE]
+Pr[Cs < Rs|γT ≤ γE]Pr[γT ≤ γE], (3.35)
where it can be written that
Pr[γT < γE] = 1 − Pr[Cs > 0], (3.36)
Moreover, because of the fact that Rs > 0, it is given that [50]
Pr[Cs < Rs|γT ≤ γE] = 1. (3.37)
Thus, (3.35) can be rewritten as
Pout(Cs) = Pr[Cs < Rs|Cs > 0]Pr[Cs > 0] + Pr[Cs ≤ 0]
= Pr[1 < γS < 22Rs] + Pr[γS < 1]
= PγS (2
2Rs),
(3.38)
where CDF of γS is given by (3.33).
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3.3.4 A Case Study: Eavesdropper without joint decoding
At this point, the differences between considered system model and the case where the illegiti-
mate node is not able to do the joint decoding, is explanted. If the eavesdropper is not capable
of joint decoding it is given that
Cs,1w/o jd = [log2
1 + γsr
1 + γse
]+, (3.39)
Cs,2w/o jd = [log2
1 + γrd
1 + γre
]+, (3.40)
in which Cs,1 and Cs,2, respectively, represent secrecy capacity of the first and the second hop.
Accordingly, secrecy capacity of the system in this case is given by
Csw/o jd = min {Cs,1,Cs,2}, (3.41)
where w/o jd subscript refers to without joint decoding and secrecy capacity of the system
with joint decoding in the presence of an eavesdropper was earlier given in (3.17).
The rest of this chapter is based on the assumption that the illegitimate entity is able to
perform joint decoding between the signals received from the first and the second phase of
transmission.
3.4 Improving the Secrecy by Using the Phase Shift Scheme
At this point, the goal is to improve the secrecy of the considered system model via a novel
energy-efficient solution. The idea behind proposed scheme is making a modification at the
signal of each hop such that the authorized receiver have access to the modification, while the
illegitimate node is not able to detect it. The aforementioned modification must be based on
a shared information between the communicating entities which is not available at the illegiti-
mate nodes.
To achieve this goal, a random phase shifting scheme is proposed where at each hop a phase
shift is applied to the in-phase and quadrature components of the original signal, as shown in
Figure 3.2. The random phase shift is denoted by ϕn,k where k ∈ {1, 2} and k indicates the hop
of transmission.
Initially, the original signal to be transmitted is represented by s and it can be written that
s = x + jy, (3.42)
where x and y are, respectively, the in-phase and quadrature components of the original signal
and j indicates the imaginary part. Prior to using the secrecy enhancement scheme, the received
signal at the illegitimate node in the first and the second phases are, respectively, given by
re,1 =
√
Pshses + n1, (3.43)
re,2 =
√
Prhres + n2. (3.44)
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Figure 3.2: Security enhancement via using phase shift scheme.
Using the phase shifting scheme the original signal can be modified to s´ such that the
random phase shift is applied to the modulated data of each hop and it is given that
s´ = e jϕn,k(x + jy), (3.45)
Once s´ is received, the intended receiver of the kth hop, which has access to ϕn,k, can remove
the random phase shift and obtain the main signal. Notably, the eavesdropper is not aware of
ϕn,k, so using the phase shifting scheme confuses the illegitimate entity. Thus, received SNR at
the illegitimate node is degraded and secrecy capacity of the system is improved.
At this point, it must be clarified that how can the random phase shift be generated such
that it is accessible for the legitimate communicating parties, but the eavesdropper is not aware
of it. Some recent researches have focused on generating a shared secret between the commu-
nicating parties based on unique information that are shared between them, as this information
is not available at the unauthorized entity. In this regard some existing studies have focused
on generating a secret key based on reciprocal channel between the legitimate communicating
entities [86]. There are two stages in order to create ϕn,k which are as the following.
• Initially, it is required to estimate the channel between the communicating parties, hsr for
the first hop or hrd for the second hop.
• Because of AWGN, the estimation of the channel at the communicating parties are differ-
ent, so a key agreement procedure is utilized to ensure that both communicating entities
have access to the same key.
Using the secrecy enhancement scheme and presuming that provision of ϕn,k has been done
successfully, the received signal at the illegitimate node in the first and the second phases are,
respectively, given by
re,1PS =
√
Pshsee jϕn,1 s + n1, (3.46)
re,2PS =
√
Prhree jϕn,2 s + n2, (3.47)
in which n1 and n2 denote AWGN of the eavesdropper respectively, in the first and the second
hops and PS subscript indicates using the phase shi f t scheme.
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Figure 3.3: MRC at the eavesdropper.
Figure 3.3 shows MRC combining at the eavesdropper where the proposed secrecy en-
hancement scheme is used. Under the assumption that the eavesdropper is capable of MRC,
and since the eavesdropper does not have access to ϕn,k, received SNR at the eavesdropper is
given by
γE,PS =
PS 2 | hse |4 +PR2 | hre |4 +2PS PR | hse |2| hre |2 cos(ϕn,1 − ϕn,2)
(PS | hse |2 +PR | hre |2)σ2 , (3.48)
Based on (3.15), if the proposed secrecy improvement scheme is not employed the received
SNR at the illegitimate node can be written as
γE =
PS | hse |2
σ2
+
PR | hre |2
σ2
=
PS 2 | hse |4 +PR2 | hre |4 +2PS PR | hse |2| hre |2
(PS | hse |2 +PR | hre |2)σ2 .
(3.49)
Comparing (3.48) and (3.49), it can be concluded that γE,PS < γE. Meaning that by using the
proposed secrecy improvement scheme, the received SNR of the illegitimate entity is degraded,
compared to the case when phase shift scheme is not utilized.
3.5 Scheme Overview
It was shown that the proposed scheme degrades the received SNR at the illegitimate entity.
Thus, since Cs = (1/2)[log2(1 + γT )/(1 + γE)]+, it can be written that
Cs,PS > Cs, (3.50)
meaning that by using the proposed secrecy enhancement scheme, the instantaneous secrecy
capacity of the system is improved. Furthermore, ergodic secrecy capacity of the system is
given by [42]
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Cs = E{Cs}. (3.51)
Since for two random variables of X and Y if X < Y it can be concluded that X < Y , it is given
that
Cs < Cs,PS . (3.52)
Therefore, in addition to the instantaneous secrecy capacity, ergodic secrecy capacity of the
system is improved.
3.6 Simulations and Performance Evaluation
Validity of the derivations and the proposed secrecy improvement scheme is investigated via
simulations in MATLAB. A two-dimensional plane is utilized for the simulations. It is pre-
sumed that the source, relay, destination and the eavesdropper are placed at S (−500, 0), R(0, 0),
D(500, 0) and E(d, 0) meters, respectively. Different values are assigned to d during simula-
tions. The global transmit power is assigned evenly between the transmitters (source and relay).
It is considered that noise variance at all terminals is −60dBm [73]. The path loss coefficient
is assumed to be 3.5. The Monte Carlo simulations are presented using an average of 105
independent trials. The simulation parameters are summarized in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Simulation set up parameters (phase shift scheme)
Simulation Parameter Value
Source location (-500,0)m
Relay location (0,0)m
Destination location (500,0)m
Eavesdropper location (0,d)m
Rs 0.1
Path loss coefficient 3.5
σ2 -60dBm
3.6.1 General Secrecy Evaluation
Secrecy capacity of the system with and without joint decoding capability at the eavesdropper
has been simulated in Figure 3.4 where d ∈ {800, 1000, 1200}meters. As Figure 3.4 illustrates
joint decoding at the eavesdropper reduces secrecy capacity of the system significantly at higher
transmit power levels.
Figure 3.5 depicts the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of global
transmit power. It is seen that increasing the global transmit power may increase the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity if the eavesdropper is located far from the transmitters. On the
contrary, if the eavesdropper is placed close to any of the transmitters, increasing the transmit
power does not improve the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity. Therefore, increasing
the global transmit power can have inverse effects on secrecy in terms of probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity if the eavesdropper is located close to any of the transmitters. In such
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Figure 3.4: Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus global transmit power, with/without joint
decoding at eavesdropper.
10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Global Transmit Power [dBm]
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f N
on
−z
er
o 
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 
 
Simulations, d=50m
Analysis, d=50m
Simulations, d=1200m
Analysis, d=1200m
Simulations, d=1500m
Analysis, d=1500m
Simulations, d=1800m
Analysis, d=1800m
Figure 3.5: Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus global transmit power.
circumstances, higher transmit power results in more leakage of the signal to the illegitimate
entities [122]. Figure 3.5 also shows that the simulation results agreed with the analytical
results and therefore the closed-from expressions are validated.
Figure 3.6 shows the probability of outage in secrecy capacity as a function of global transit
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Figure 3.6: Probability of outage in secrecy capacity versus global transmit power, Rs = 0.1.
power. This figure illustrates that increasing the global transmit power can improve the secrecy
of the system in terms of probability of outage in secrecy capacity, but as mentioned before,
the effect of increasing global transmit power on secrecy also depends on the location of the
eavesdropper. As if the eavesdropper is placed very close to any of the transmitters, increasing
the transmit power can have adverse results on secrecy. Moreover, Figure 3.6 validates the
closed-from expressions of probability of outage in secrecy capacity. It is obvious that by
moving the eavesdropper to further locations secrecy of the system in terms of probability of
outage in secrecy capacity and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity improves, as seen in
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6.
3.6.2 Evaluation of Proposed Random Phase Shift Scheme
For the purpose of evaluating the performance of the proposed secrecy improvement scheme,
it is presumed that ϕn,k is a random variable with uniform distribution where
ϕn,k ∼ U[0, 2pi]. (3.53)
By using the proposed scheme, as seen in Figure 3.7, ergodic secrecy capacity of the system
improves significantly. To investigate the effect of the proposed scheme at higher levels of
power, according to (3.17), when PS , PR → ∞ it can be written that
Cs =
1
2
[log2
γT
γE
]+. (3.54)
Thus, based on (3.48) at higher levels of power, the proposed scheme always results in a better
secrecy performance compared to the case where the phase shift scheme is not employed.
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Figure 3.7: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus global transmit power.
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Figure 3.8: Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus global transmit power, phase shift scheme.
However, the secrecy capacity of the system at higher power levels has an upper bound which
is due to the location of the eavesdropper, as it is seen in Figure 3.7.
Next, Figure 3.8 illustrates that the proposed secrecy enhancement scheme can improve
the secrecy in terms of probability of non-zero secrecy capacity. This figure also implies the
bounds on secrecy due to the location of the eavesdropper.
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3.7 Discussion
According to the previous section, the main contributions are elaborated as the following.
• The numerical results validated the closed-form expressions of the probability of outage
in secrecy capacity and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity.
• Although increasing the transmit power can improve the secrecy, this is not always valid.
The effect of increasing the power must be examined according to the location of the
eavesdropper, as if the illegitimate node is close to the transmitter, increasing the transmit
power does not improve the secrecy.
• The bound of secrecy capacity on high power levels refers back to the location of the
eavesdropper.
• The proposed secrecy improvement scheme always outperforms the initial transmission
in terms of ergodic secrecy capacity of the system.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, a novel secrecy enhancement scheme was proposed to improve the ergodic
secrecy capacity of a two-hop DF relaying system in which the unauthorized entity was able to
overhear the communications of both hops. The closed-form expressions of the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity and probability of outage in secrecy capacity were presented.
Moreover, a random phase shift scheme was suggested to improve the security. The intro-
duced scheme injected a random phase shift at the modulated data symbols of the hops where
the related phase shift was created based on a shared information between the transmitter and
desired receiver of each hop such that the adversary nodes were not aware of it. Using this
scheme, the received SNR at the illegitimate node was degraded and accordingly secrecy ca-
pacity of the system was improved. The channel reciprocity between the source and relay in
the first hop, or the relay and destination in the second hop could be exploited to create the
random phase shift. It was shown that using this scheme boosted the ergodic secrecy capacity
of the system. The proposed scheme is applicable in the systems where the power resources
are limited. In addition, due to the ease of using channel reciprocity, the complexity of the
presented scheme is low.
Chapter 4
Improving the Secrecy in Multi-hop DF
Relaying Systems
In this chapter, secure transmission in a multi-hop DF relaying system over Rayleigh fading
channels is investigated where the transmission is carried out in the presence of multiple non-
colluding illegitimate entities. It is important to analyze the secrecy performance of the system
in such a scenario in order to better understand the secrecy risks and to improve the secrecy rate
of the system. Consequently, secrecy parameters of this system (e.g., probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity, probability of outage in secrecy capacity) is examined.
The objective of this chapter is to present a cost-effective solution to improve the secrecy
where there are multiple wiretappers which can overhear the communication. A novel secrecy
improvement strategy is suggested, based on a new way of using artificial noise, and it is shown
that ergodic secrecy capacity of the system can have significant improvement via exploiting this
strategy . In particular, in the new way of using artificial noise, the jamming signal is generated
at the transmitter based on a shared knowledge between the source and the desired receiver.
Due to the importance of power allocation between friendly jamming and main signal, power
allocation solutions are also presented in this chapter, to make sure that the proposed scheme
have helpful results in terms of secrecy.
4.1 Introduction
Multi-hop communications are one of the most promising techniques in wireless communica-
tions because of their remarkable advantages, as they mitigate channel fading and shadowing
and increase the coverage [123]. Reliability and performance of multi-hop communication
systems have already been studied widely in the litrature [25]-[27].
However, secrecy and privacy of wireless communications is one of the main concerns of in
multi-hop communication systems due to the broadcast characteristic of wireless medium. Se-
cure communications aims at providing the information at the intended receiver while ensuring
that the illegitimate and unauthorized nodes do not have access to it. In this regard, physical
layer security has lately attracted a lot of research efforts[30]. To this end, the physical charac-
teristic of the wireless channel can be used in relaying communication systems to enhance the
security [114]. Specifically, it has been shown that under certain circumstances, secrecy capac-
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ity of a wireless communication system can improve from zero to a positive secrecy capacity
via using relays [124]. Some existing studies have focused on a simple case where communica-
tion takes place in the presence of a single illegitimate entity [6], [30],[125]. In particular, the
work presented in [30] investigated the communication of a multi-hop DF relaying system in
the presence of an eavesdropper and it presented an optimized relay placement scheme which
maximized the secrecy capacity.
In addition, communications in the enarioes where multiple eavesdroppers are able to wire-
tap the transmission signal, was examined in [50] and [64]. An interesting work in [6], pointed
out that degrading the received SNR at the illegitimate entities, via artificial noise, can in-
crease the secrecy of a communication system. The basic idea of artificial noise was initially
introduced by [71] and [126]. Artificial noise has also been called cooperative jamming and
secure relaying in some existing studies [114],[126]. Notably, conventional way of using arti-
ficial noise needs an extra hardware to create friendly jamming signal. Moreover, the network
overheads, for the purpose of coordination between the main network and the helper, is in-
creased. Thus, many researchers have been led to alternative secrecy improvement schemes
[100], [125].
Recently, authors of [44] suggested that transmitters of a two-hop communication system
should allocate a portion of their available power to create friendly jamming. It was considered
that the artificial noise was created according to a shared secret between the transmitter and
intended receiver, but the illegitimate entity was not aware of it. This interesting strategy is
cost-effective, as the extra helper is not required and the coordination between the additional
node and the original network is eliminated. In this chapter, the aforementioned strategy is
extended to a multi-hop DF relaying communication system. In addition, a more complex case
is studied where there are multiple eavesdroppers which can wiretap the communication signal.
4.2 System Model
The wireless system model shown in Fig. 4.1 is considered, where the source and destination
can communicate through N−1 intermediate DF relays. This chapter mainly deals with the case
where communication takes place in the presence of M non-colluding eavesdroppers. During
the transmission of each codeword from one node to the other, the related channel fading
coefficients are constant. However, the fading coefficients vary independently and randomly
whenever the codewords change [127].
For simplicity, throughout the formulations , the source and the destination are, respec-
tively, tagged by 0 and N while k denotes kth relay, k = {1, 2, ...,N − 1}. Also, the channel
related to the link from node i to node j is represented by hi j and the channel fading coefficients
of each two nodes are independent from the other pairs of nodes. The practical assumption that
all the nodes in this system model are half-duplex, is valid. Additionally, a similar assumption
as in [92] is used, where it is presumed that the nodes can solely receive signals from their ad-
jacent neighbors located in their most left-handed side and the most right-handed side. Hence
the direct link between the source and the destination does not exist and transmission from the
source to the intended receiver is performed in N phases.
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Figure 4.1: Communication through multiple DF relays in the presence of M eavesdroppers.
4.3 Preliminaries
Based on what mentioned earlier in chapter 2, the maximal value of transmission rate from the
source to the intended receiver such that the illegitimate entity cannot access the data, is termed
secrecy capacity. Accordingly, secrecy capacity of kth hop can be written as [17, p. 62]
Cs,k = [Ct,k −Ce,k]+, (4.1)
in which Ct,k and Ce,k, respectively, represent the capacity of the main and eavesdropper links
at kth hop of transmission. Capacity of the main link at kth hop is given by
Ct,k = log2(1 + γt,k), (4.2)
in which γt,k is the instantaneous received SNR of kth node at kth phase of transmission and it
is expressed as
γt,k =
Pk−1,k | h(k−1)k |2
σ2
, (4.3)
where Pk−1,k is the transmission power of (k − 1)th node at kth hop of transmission.
It is presumed that σ2 is the variance of AWGN noise at all the entities. It is considered that
communication takes place over Rayleigh fading channels and fading coefficients are assumed
to be zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables.
Therefore, γt,k has exponential distribution and related PDF and CDF , respectively, are
expressed by [118, p. 188]
pγt,k(γ) =
1
γt,k
exp(− γ
γt,k
), (4.4)
Pγt,k(γ) = 1 − exp(−
γ
γt,k
), (4.5)
in which γt,k is the average received SNR at kth hop and it is given by
γt,k =
Pk−1,kE{| h(k−1)k |2}
σ2
. (4.6)
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In this chapter, it is presumed that transmission of different hops are carried out via using
randomized code-books. Accordingly, the illegitimate nodes cannot jointly decode the received
signals of different phases [124]. Thus, the capacity of the eavesdropper link at kth hop is given
by
Ce,k = log2(1 + γe,k), (4.7)
where the instantaneous received SNR of the eavesdropper link at kth phase of transmission is
represented by γe,k. Reverting back to the assumption that the multiple eavesdroppers in this
system model are non-colluding, the instantaneous received SNR of the eavesdropper link at
kth phase of transmission is given by [129]
γe,k = maxMm=1γem,k, (4.8)
in which γem,k is the received SNR of the mth eavesdropper at kth phase of transmission and it
is given by
γem,k =
Pk−1,k | h(k−1)em |2
σ2
. (4.9)
Moreover, CDF of γem,k is expressed by
Pγem ,k(γ) = 1 − exp(−
γ
γem,k
), (4.10)
where at kth phase of transmission, the average received SNR of the mth illegitimate node is
represented by γem,k and it is given that
γem,k =
Pk−1,kE{| h(k−1)em |2}
σ2
. (4.11)
Assuming that secrecy decisions rely on a per hop basis, secrecy capacity of the system is
given by
Cs =
1
N
minNk=1Cs,k, (4.12)
where 1/N refers back to the fact that transmission from the source to the intended destination
is performed in N phases.
4.4 Transmission in the Presence of Multiple Non-colluding
Eavesdroppers
In this section, the analysis for the main security performance criteria of this system model are
presented. Specifically, the closed-form expression of probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
and probability of outage in secrecy capacity are derived and ergodic secrecy capacity of this
system model is examined. Prior to any secrecy analysis, the parameters ωk and ωe2e are
introduced as the following to facilitate the analysis.
ωk ,
1 + γt,k
1 + γe,k
, (4.13)
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ωe2e , minNk=1ωk. (4.14)
Therefore, (4.12) can be rewritten as
Cs =
1
N
log2ωe2e, (4.15)
Since the values of ωk are statistically independent, CDF of ωe2e is expressed by
PΩe2e(ω) = 1 − Pr[ω1 > ω, ...., ωN > ω]
= 1 −
N∏
k=1
(1 − PΩk(ω)),
(4.16)
in which PΩk(.) is CDF of ωk and it can be written as
PΩk(ω) = Pr[ωk < ω]
= Pr[
1 + γt,k
1 + γe,k
< ω].
2 (4.17)
Hence, it is concluded that
PΩk(ω) =
∫ ∞
0
Pγt,k(ω(1 + γe) − 1)pγe,k(γe)dγe, (4.18)
Accordingly to (4.18), in order to derive PΩk(.), Pγt,k(.) and pγe,k(.) are required. Pγt,k(.) has
already been provided in (4.5), so at this point it is needed to derive PDF of γe,k.
Derivation of pγe,k(.):
Using (4.8), CDF of γe,k can be written as
Pγe,k(γ) =
M∏
m=1
Pγem ,k(γ). (4.19)
Inserting (4.10) into (4.18) yields
Pγe,k(γ) =
M∏
m=1
(1 − exp(− γ
γem,k
))
=
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
...
1∑
jM=0
(−1) j1+ j2+...+ jM×
exp(
− j1γ
γe1,k
+
− j2γ
γe2,k
+ ... +
− jMγ
γeM ,k
).
(4.20)
Using (4.20), PDF of γe,k is given by
pγe,k(γ) =
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
...
1∑
jM=0
(−1) j1+ j2+...+ jM×
(
− j1
γe1,k
+
− j2
γe2,k
+ ... +
− jM
γeM ,k
)×
exp(
− j1γ
γe1,k
+
− j2γ
γe2,k
+ ... +
− jMγ
γeM ,k
).
(4.21)
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Derivation of PΩk:
In order to derive CDF of Ωk, (4.5) and (4.21) are substituted in (4.18). Hence it is given
that
PΩk(ω) = 1 − e
−ω+1
γt,k
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
...
1∑
jM=0
(−1) j1+ j2+...+ jM×
(
− j1
γe1,k
+
− j2
γe2,k
+ ... +
− jM
γeM ,k
)×
1
( ω
γt,k
+
j1
γe1 ,k
+
j2
γe2 ,k
+ ... + jM
γeM ,k
)
.
(4.22)
Derivation of PΩe2e(ω):
Based on (4.16) and (4.22), CDF of Ωe2e is given by
PΩe2e(ω) = 1 −
N∏
k=1
[e
−ω+1
γt,k
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
...
1∑
jM=0
(−1) j1+ j2+...+ jM×
(
− j1
γe1,k
+
− j2
γe2,k
+ ... +
− jM
γeM ,k
)×
1
( ω
γt,k
+
j1
γe1 ,k
+
j2
γe2 ,k
+ ... + jM
γeM ,k
)
].
(4.23)
4.4.1 Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
It has been defined in chapter 2 that the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity indicates the
probability that the capacity of the main channel is higher than the capacity of the eavesdropper
channel. Therefore, in the considered system model it is given by
Pr[Cs > 0] = Pr[Cr > Ce]. (4.24)
According to (4.15), (4.24) can be derived as
Pr[Cs > 0] = Pr[ωe2e > 1]
= 1 − PΩe2e(1).
(4.25)
where PΩe2e(.) is given by (4.23).
4.4.2 Probability of Outage in Secrecy Capacity
As mentioned in chapter 2, the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is lower
than a target secrecy rate, Rs, refers to the probability of outage in secrecy capacity and it is
expressed by [50].
Pout(Rs) = Pr[Cs < Rs], (4.26)
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where Rs represents the desired secrecy rate. Based on the total probability theorem, (4.26) is
reformulated as
Pout(Cs) = Pr[Cs < Rs|Cs > 0]Pr[Cs > 0] + Pr[Cs ≤ 0]
= PΩe2e(2
N×Rs).
(4.27)
where CDF of ωe2e is expressed by (4.23).
4.4.3 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The mathematical expectation (i.e., mean or average) of maximum achievable secrecy rate
implies ergodic secrecy capacity and for the considered system model, it is expressed by [72]
Cs =
1
N
E{minNk=1Cs,kAN}. (4.28)
ESC is a secrecy performance criterion which has been used widely in literature and this chap-
ter to evaluate and assess the secrecy of communication systems.
4.5 A Case Study: Communication in the Presence of Col-
luding Eavesdroppers.
Although the considered system model is based on the non-colluding eavesdroppers assump-
tion, at this point, the colluding wiretappers scenario is briefly studied to clarify the differences
between collaborative and the non-collaborative eavesdroppers. As it was mentioned in chapter
2, colluding eavesdroppers is the worse case scenario in terms of secrecy, where at each hop,
the eavesdroppers are able to overhear the transmitted information and perform maximal ratio
combining. Thus, base on equation (2.9) the received SNR of the illegitimate link at kth hop
can be written as [129]
γe,k =
∑M
m=1
(γem,k), (4.29)
where γem,k is given by (4.9). Due to the fact that the fading coefficients of all channels are zero-
mean complex Gaussian random variables, γem,k are independent and exponentially distributed
variables. Accordingly, based on (4.29) and [130], PDF of γem,k can be written as
pγe,k(γ) = [
M∏
m=1
1
γem,k
]
M∑
j=0
e
−γ
/γem , j∏M
i=1,i, j(
1
γem ,i
− 1
γem , j
)
(4.30)
Henceforth, the aim is to derive the CDF of Ωe2e in the presence of multiple colluding eaves-
droppers. Applying (4.5) and (4.30) in (4.18) results in
PΩk(ω) = 1 − e
−ω+1
γt,k [
M∏
m=1
1
γem,k
]×
M∑
j=0
(
1∏M
i=1,i, j(
1
γem ,i
− 1
γem , j
)
× 1
ω + 1
γem , j
)
(4.31)
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Utilizing (4.31) in (4.16), CDF of ωe2e is given by
PΩ(ω) =1 −
N∏
k=1
[e
−ω+1
γt,k [
M∏
m=1
1
γem,k
]×
M∑
j=0
(
1∏M
i=1,i, j(
1
γem ,i
− 1
γem , j
)
× 1
ω + 1
γem , j
)].
(4.32)
4.6 Exploiting Artificial Noise
As it was mentioned previously in chapter 2, the artificial noise in essence is an interference
which is created intentionality in order to mislead the eavesdropper and therefore, degrade the
received SNR at the illegitimate entity and improve the secrecy. Authors of a recent work
[44], have presented a different way of using artificial noise in which the transmitter assigns a
portion of its power to create friendly jamming signal, i.e., intentional jamming is generated at
the transmitter and thus, an extra node is not needed.
In this chapter, the latter way of generating artificial noise is employed because of the
reasons which are as the following.
• This approach does not rely on any extra entity to create the jamming signal.
• Unlike conventional artificial noise, the coordination between the additional node and
the main network is not needed, which results in lower complexity.
In terms of implementation of the new approach of using artificial noise, a pseudo-random
noise generator can be utilized to generate friendly jamming signal where there are finite sta-
tuses for the noise generator. Using a secure control channel, the status of the pseudo-random
noise generator is sent to the intended receiver of each hop. Hence, the intended receiver can be
informed about the created artificial noise so it can eliminate the intentional noise and retrieve
the main signal [44].
4.7 Proposed Security Enhancement Scheme via Artificial
Noise
In this section, a secrecy improvement scheme is presented to be employed in the multi-hop DF
relaying system shown in Fig. 4.1. The proposed scheme exploits friendly jamming to enhance
the secrecy by degrading the received SNR at the eavesdroppers where transmission is taking
place in the presence of multiple non-colluding illegitimate nodes.
In order to extend the new approach of using artificial noise to the considered system model,
it is suggested that at kth hop of transmission, from node k − 1 to the node k, the transmitter is
permitted to assign a portion of its available power to create the friendly jamming. Thus, the
artificial noise is sent in addition to the main signal, and the received signal of kth node at kth
phase of transmission is given by
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yk,kAN =
√
αkPtk−1h(k−1)kxk+
√
(1 − αk)Ptk−1h(k−1)k x´k + nk, (4.33)
in which xk and x´k, respectively, denote the main signal and the cooperative jamming signal.
Moreover, αk represent the power allocation factor at kth hop between the main signal and
artificial noise, 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1. Hereon, nk represents noise at the kth intended receiver. Similarly,
the received signal of mth eavesdropper at kth phase of transmission is given by
yem,k =
√
αkPtk−1h(k−1)em xk+
√
(1 − αk)Ptk−1h(k−1)em x´k + ne, (4.34)
where nem is noise of the mth eavesdropper at kth phase of transmission.
Because of the elimination of the friendly jamming at the intended receiver, the received
SNR of kth node at kth phase of signal transmission can be written as
γt,kAN =
αkPtk−1 | h(k−1)k |2
σ2
. (4.35)
Using equation (4.3), (4.35) can be rewritten as
γt,kAN = αkγt,k. (4.36)
Since the mth eavesdropper is not aware of the intentional interference, its received SNR at kth
hop can be given as
γem,kAN =
αkPtk−1 | h(k−1)em |2
σ2 + (1 − αk)Ptk−1 | h(k−1)em |2
. (4.37)
Invoking (4.8), it can be concluded that
γe,kAN = max
M
m=1
αkPtk−1 | h(k−1)em |2
σ2 + (1 − αk)Ptk−1 | h(k−1)em |2
. (4.38)
Thus, using artificial noise, secrecy capacity of kth phase is given by
Cs,kAN = [log2(
1 + αkγt,k
1 + γe,kAN
)]+. (4.39)
Henceforth, parameters ωkAN and ωAN are defined to facilitate the formulations.
ωkAN ,
1 + αkγt,k
1 + γe,kAN
, (4.40)
ωAN , minNk=1ωkAN . (4.41)
Substituting these definitions, (4.39) can be rewritten as
Cs,kAN = [log2ωkAN]
+. (4.42)
Accordingly, it is given that
2NCs,k AN ∝ ωkAN , (4.43)
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and
2NCsAN ∝ ωAN . (4.44)
Therefore, if using artificial noise-based scheme results in increasing minNk=1ωkAN , it can
be concluded that min{Cs,1AN , ...Cs,N AN} > min{Cs,1, ...,Cs,N}, and so CsAN > Cs, meaning that
the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the system is improved. Notably, these results can be
extended to ergodic secrecy capacity. As for two random variables, X and Y , if X > Y , it can
be written that E{X} > E{Y}. Thus, it is written that E{CsAN} > E{Cs}.
Substituting equations (4.8), (4.35) and (4.37) in (4.40) results in
ωkAN =
1 + αkPt |h(k−1)k |
2
σ2
1 + maxMm=1
αkPt |h(k−1)em |2
σ2+(1−αk)Pt |h(k−1)em |2
=
1 + αkγt,k
1 + maxMm=1
αkγem ,k
1+(1−αk)γem ,k
.
(4.45)
Equation (4.45) indicates the importance of power allocation between the main signal and the
friendly jamming in order to ensure that ωkAN and ωAN are improved.
4.8 Power Allocation
Presenting power allocation strategies between main signal and friendly jamming signal is the
aim of this section. Notably, this problem can be solved under two circumstances as below:
• Global CSI including the channel state information of the eavesdroppers is available.
• Channel state information of the eavesdroppers is not available (neither instantaneous
CSI nor its statistics).
It it presumed that available power of each transmitter is Pt. According to equation (4.45), the
optimization problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate is formulated as
αk
∗ = arg max{ωkAN(αk)}, (4.46)
where αk∗ represents the optimal value of power allocation. By setting the first derivative of
(4.46) into zero, the optimal value of the power allocation factor is concluded as
αk
∗ =
γt,k + γt,k(maxMm=1γem,k) − (maxMm=1γem,k)
2γt,k(maxMm=1γem,k)
. (4.47)
If αk∗ ∈ [0, 1], it further yields to αk = αk∗.
In addition, for the cases in which a non-zero secrecy rate is not achievable, it is given that
αk = 0. Also in the case where friendly jamming scheme is not employed, it can be concluded
that αk = 1, in which case the total available power is dedicated to main signal only.
Interestingly, equation (4.47) implies some noteworthy insights that are stated below:
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• The optimal power allocation solution relies on instantaneous global channel state infor-
mation. Notably, the channel state information is traceable for the cases in which the
rate of changes in channel fading coefficients are slower than the transmission rate, e.g.,
in quasi-static channels. Therefore, the power allocation factors must be updated and
renewed in practice, based on the rate of changes in channel fading coefficients.
• The instantaneous channel state information is not traceable in some practical scenarios.
On the other hand, the statistics of the corresponding channels may be accessible [81].
In that case, it is suggested to use Jensen’s inequality and specify the bounds of ergodic
secrecy rate and provide the optimal power allocation solutions [44].
• Equation (4.47) requires the channel state information of the illegitimate nodes. How-
ever, mostly in practice, the CSI of the eavesdroppers or its statistics are not avail-
able.Thus, it is essential to present alternative solutions in which the knowledge of CSI
of the unauthorized nodes is not required.
• A variety of factors affect the optimal value of αk, for example, spatial locations of the
legitimate and illegitimate entities, available transmit power, and the global channel state
information.
4.9 Sub-optimal Solution
Due to the dependency of the optimal power allocation factor on the channel state information
of the eavesdroppers, there is a need for alternative sub-optimal solutions which do not rely on
the CSI of the unauthorized entities. Hereon, a sub-optimal solution which does not need any
knowledge about the channel state information of the illegitimate nodes is suggested. Using
(4.45) and neglecting the white thermal noise at the illegitimate entities, it is given that [44]
ωkAN '
1 + αkPt |h(k−1)k |
2
σ2
1 + maxMm=1
αkPt |h(k−1)em |2
(1−αk)Pt |h(k−1)em |2
. (4.48)
Hence, (4.48) can be reformulated as
ωkAN ' 1 + αkγt,k1 + αk(1−αk)
. (4.49)
By setting the derivative of (4.49) into zero, it can be concluded that
αk
∗ =
γt,k − 1
2γt,k
=
1
2
− 1
2γt,k
. (4.50)
Interesting, equation (4.50) implies is that when γt,k → ∞, the power allocation factor ap-
proaches 0.5.
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Figure 4.2: Communication via multiple DF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper.
4.10 A Case Study: Transmission in the Presence of an Eaves-
dropper
At this point, it is presumed that communication takes place in the presence of an illegitimate
entity as seen in Fig. 4.2. In this case, the received SNR of the eavesdropper at kth phase of
transmission is initially given by
γe,kAN =
Ptk−1 | h(k−1)e |2
σ2
. (4.51)
Therefore, according to equation (4.37), by using the secrecy enhancement scheme, the
received SNR at the eavesdropper is formulated as
γe,kAN =
αkPtk−1 | h(k−1)e |2
σ2 + (1 − αk)Ptk−1 | h(k−1)e |2
. (4.52)
Hereon, defining the parameters θk and θ as the following facilitates the analysis.
θk ,
1 + αkγt,k
1 + γe,kAN
, (4.53)
θ , minNk=1θk. (4.54)
Hence, it is given that
CsAN =
1
N
minNk=1Cs,kAN
=
1
N
minNk=1[log2
1 + αkγt,k
1 + γe,kAN
]+
=
1
N
minNk=1(log2 θk)
=
1
N
log2 θ.
(4.55)
Accordingly, it is given that
2NCs,k AN ∝ θk, (4.56)
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and also
2NCsAN ∝ θ. (4.57)
If the available global power at all the transmitters are set to Pt, based on (4.53), it can be
written that
θk =
1 + αkPt |h(k−1)k |
2
σ2
1 + αkPt |h(k−1)e |
2
σ2+(1−αk)Pt |h(k−1)e |2
. (4.58)
At this point, it is presumed that the total power at the transmitters are equal to Pt. Since
the channels are quasi-static, the transmitters (source or relays) can use the channel state in-
formation and perform optimization to maximize the secrecy rate subject to the limited power
resources and αk bounds. According to equation (4.58), for each hop, θk can be reformulated
as
θk =
1 + αkγt,k
1 + αkγe,k1+(1−αk)γe,k
. (4.59)
Thus, the maximization problem per hop can be formulated as
max
αk
θk(αk)
s.t. 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1.
By setting the derivative of θk equal to zero, if the aforementioned constraints are met, the
optimal value of αk can be obtained as
αk
∗ =
γt,k + γt,kγe,k − γe,k
2γt,kγe,k
. (4.60)
However, it is considered that αk = 0 if a non-zero secrecy rate is not achievable, and αk = 1 if
artificial noise is not employed.
4.11 A Case Study: Security Enhancement Using Conven-
tional Cooperative Jamming
In this case study, conventional artificial noise is used to enhance the security. In this scheme,
during the (k + 1)th hop of transmission, from the node k to the node (k + 1), node (k− 1) sends
the cooperative jamming signal, as shown in Fig. 4.3. However, friendly jamming signal does
not affect the received signal at (k + 1)th node, because as explained in the system model and
assumed in [92], the legitimate nodes can only receive signals from the two nearest legitimate
neighbors. Since the jammer is inaudible to the legitimate receiver of kth hop, therefore the
received signal at each hop can be written as (4.3) and its PDF and CDF can be expressed by
(4.4) and (4.5), respectively.
In order to enhance the secrecy of the first hop, an external jammer labeled as (−1) th node
is assumed at a location where it is not audible to first relay. Consequently, the received signal
of mth eavesdropper at (k + 1)th hop can be written as
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Figure 4.3: Security enhancement, using conventional cooperative jamming
γem,k+1 =
Ptk | hkem |2
σ2 + P jk−1 | h(k−1)em |2
(4.61)
where P jk−1 is the jamming power of the (k-1)th node during (k+1)th hop of transmission.
If secrecy capacity at kth hop with cooperative jamming is denoted by CsCJ ,k, it can be
written that
CsCJ ,k = log2(
1 + γt,k
1 + γeCJ ,k
) (4.62)
where γeCJ ,k is the instantaneous received SNR of the eavesdropper at kth hop when coop-
erative jamming is utilized. If γe,k > γeCJ ,k , it can be written that Cs,k < CsCJ ,k and Cs = E{Cs}
[72].
Note that if the eavesdropper is located at a location where it does not receive the coop-
erative jamming signal while it receives the original signal, then cooperative jamming is not
able to reduce the leakage of the information to the eavesdropper. On other words, in this case,
the secrecy enhancement does not occur and γe,k > γeCJ ,k cannot be valid. Therefore, the new
artificial noise approach has the advantage that if an eavesdropper receives the main signal, it
also receives the cooperative jamming while these assumptions are not valid in conventional
artificial noise which is the scenario in the current case study. In addition, if an eavesdropper is
located very close to the legitimate nodes, secrecy performance results are similar to the case
where the relays are untrusted DF relays, therefore, non-zero secrecy capacity is not achievable
[53].
In order to achieve the end-to-end secrecy performance of the proposed system via friendly
jamming, (4.61) and (4.62) are invoked in (4.12).
CsCJ =
1
N
minNk=1(CsCJ ,k) =
1
N
minNk=1(log2(
1 + γt,k
1 + γeCJ ,k
)) =
1
N
minNk=1(log2(
1 + γt,k
1 + maxMm=1 γem,k
)) =
1
N
minNk=1min
M
m=1(log2(
1 + γt,k
1 + γem,k
)) =
1
N
minNk=1min
M
m=1(log2(νm,k))
(4.63)
in which νm,k , 1 + γt,k/1 + γem,k. Interestingly, the end to end secrecy capacity would
increase only if there is a secrecy enhancement in the hop with the least secrecy capacity.
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4.12 Numerical Results
In this section, the validity of the presented closed-form expressions and the performance of the
proposed secrecy improvement scheme are investigated. During simulations, noise variance
of all terminals are −60 dBm [73] and the path loss coefficient is assumed to be 3.5. The
source and destination are, respectively, placed at S (0, 0) and D(1000, 0) meters. The relays
are distributed according to a uniform location scheme, meaning that the distance between
successive authorized entities is d = 1000/N meters. Therefore, it is given that Rn(nd, 0) where
n ∈ {1, ...,N − 1}). The available transmit power is assigned evenly between the transmitters
(source and relays). An average of 105 independent trials have been used for the purpose of
Monte Carlo simulations. The summary of the simulation parameters are presented in the table
4.1.
Table 4.1: Simulation set up parameters (new way of using artificial noise)
Simulation Parameter Value
Source location (0,0)m
Relay location (nd,0)m
Destination location (1000,0)m
Rs 0.1
Path loss coefficient 3.5
σ2 -60dBm
4.12.1 General Secrecy Performance
In Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5, first fix the location of the eavesdroppers at E1 (500, 700) and E2
(1000, 1700) meters. Then, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of avail-
able transmit power has been simulated in Fig. 4.4. This figure illustrates that raising the
transmit power results in enhancing the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity if the adver-
sary nodes are not close to the transmitters (source, relays). On the contrary, in the cases where
any illegitimate entity is located not far from the transmitters, rasing the transit power results
in increasing the received SNR at the wiretappers so the secrecy of the system is degraded
[122]. In addition, as pointed out in [6], enhancing the received SNR at the intended receiver
can improve the secrecy of the system, as in Fig. 4.4 probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
is enhanced. Moreover, the closed-form expressions of the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity which were derived earlier in this chapter are verified in here.
Fig. 4.5 shows that for the cases in which the eavesdroppers are not placed close to the
transmitters, improving the global transmit power can enhance the probability of outage in
secrecy capacity. Moreover, the closed-form expressions of probability of outage in secrecy
capacity are validated by the simulations. Interestingly, in order to investigate the effect of
global transmit power on secrecy, the spatial location of the illegitimate nodes must also be
considered [125]. Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5 indicate that if using the relay nodes enhances the
received SNR at the desired receiver, then maximum achievable secrecy rate of the system is
also improved.
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Figure 4.4: Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus global transmit power.
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Figure 4.5: Probability of outage in secrecy capacity versus global transmit power.
4.12.2 Evaluation of the Proposed Secrecy Improvement Scheme
Two benchmarks are presented as below to facilitate the evaluation of the performance of the
proposed secrecy enhancement scheme.
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Figure 4.6: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus power allocation factor with and without AN
• W/OAN: In this case, it is considered that all the available power is used for transmission
of the main signal and friendly jamming signal is not employed. This benchmark reverts
back to without arti f icial noise case and therefore w/o AN subscript has been used to
indicate it.
• No Eve: In the second benchmark, it is assumed that there is no eavesdropper to wiretap
the main signal. No Eve subscript implies this case.
Fig. 4.6 reflects the effect of power allocation among the main signal and the jamming
signal. It is considered that the eavesdroppers are located at E1(−1050, 0) and E2(1150, 0)
meters. This figure is based on an assumption that the proposed secrecy enhancement scheme
has just been applied in the last hop of transmission. Moreover, the available transmit power
is set to 45dBm and it has been assigned evenly between the transmitters (source and relays).
This figure illustrates that one can enhance the ergodic secrecy capacity of the system via using
the proposed strategy if power allocation has been devised appropriately.
Fig. 4.7 considers transmission in the presence of an eavesdropper located at E(e, 0) and
where the proposed AN strategy is only used in the last hop of transmission, αN = α. This
figure reveals that the optimal value of α is influenced by different factors such as total global
power and location of the eavesdropper. It is assumed that the friendly jamming is just utilized
in the last hop of transmission. In this figure the value of ESC at α = 1 represents the case
when artificial noise is not utilized.
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Figure 4.7: Ergodic secrecy capacity as a function of α, Pt.
Ergodic secrecy capacity of the system as a function of global transmit power, with and
without using the proposed friendly jamming strategy, has been shown in Fig. 4.8 where
E1(−1050, 0) and E2(1150, 0) meters. This figure indicates that using the optimal power al-
location solution can enhance the ergodic secrecy capacity of the system significantly in com-
parison with the case where the cooperative jamming strategy is not employed. Moreover, the
two approaches to improve the secrecy rate which were indicated in [6] have been shown here.
First, the received SNR at the intended receiver is enhanced via using intermediate relay nodes.
Second, the received SNR of the unauthorized entities are degraded by the intentional jamming
signal.
In Fig. 4.9 a single hop communication system has been considered where the location of
one of the eavesdroppers is changing from E1(−1000, 0) to E1(1000, 0) meters and the other
eavesdropper is placed fixed at E2(1500, 0) meters. The available transmit power of this system
model is set to Pt = 45dBm. Fig. 4.9 implies that for the cases in which one of the eavesdroppers
is placed not far from the transmitters, the optimal and sub-optimal solutions enhance the ESC
of the system and the results of the sub-optimal solution and the optimal solution are tightened.
4.13 Discussion
Based on the previous section, the main results are stated below:
• The closed-form expressions of secrecy in terms of the probability of outage in secrecy
capacity and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity were validated via simulations
and numerical results.
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Figure 4.9: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus the location of one of the eavesdroppers.
• Having a proper power allocation between main signal and friendly jamming improved
the secrecy.
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• The optimal value of α relied on different factors such as available global power, the
spatial location of the legitimate and illegitimate nodes,etc.
• The optimal solution always enhanced the ergodic secrecy capacity of the system, in
comparison with the case in which the presented artificial jamming signal was not used.
• The results of the sub-optimal solution and the optimal solution are very similar if at
least one of the eavesdroppers is placed close to a transmitter.
4.14 Summary
In this chapter, a secrecy enhancement strategy was employed which is based on friendly jam-
ming. This chapter followed a new way of using artificial noise where the intentional jamming
signal was generated at the transmitter and it was sent along with the main signal. Hence,
the transmitter assigned a fraction of its power for creating the intentional noise. It must be
pointed out that the new way of using artificial noise was adopted in this chapter because of
considerable advantages as following. First, in the new approach, unlike conventional AN, any
extra helper was not needed to generate the intentional jamming signal. Second, complexity
of this solution in terms of network overheads was less, in comparison with conventional arti-
ficial noise. Accordingly, this approach was introduced as a cost-effective and energy efficient
approach.
Note that power allocation between the friendly jamming and the main signal was needed
to ensure that the presented scheme improves the secrecy. Thus, under the assumption that the
available transmit power at the transmitters (source and relays) was limited, an optimal power
allocation solution has been devised to maximize the secrecy capacity. In many applicable
scenarios, the channel state information of the illegitimate entities is not available while the
optimal solution required this knowledge. Thence, a sub-optimal solution was offered where
the CSI of the unauthorized nodes were not necessary. It was shown that the presented optimal
solution outperformed the base-line case (i.e., No AN case). In addition, the sub-optimal solu-
tion and the optimal solution results were similar if one of the illegitimate entities was close to
one of the transmitters.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes this thesis, summarizes key results, and sheds light on open areas for
future work in the context of security in cooperative communication systems.
5.1 Conclusion
Cooperative communications is inseparable from today’s and future’s development of wire-
less communication systems due to various advantages such as increasing the coverage and
impairing fading effects. However, wireless communications through the air medium which
is accessible for unauthorized and malicious entities, results in a number of security vulner-
abilities. This thesis was focused on security enhancement techniques on physical layer in
cooperative communications. Note that the upper layer strategies have been already studied
in the literature in an extensive manner. However, there was a need to provide comprehensive
security solutions through different layers of the protocol stack. Towards this goal, this the-
sis covered diverse physical-layer security solutions for cooperative communications including
information-theoretic techniques, diversity techniques, beamforming solutions and cooperating
jamming strategies, in addition to physical-layer authentication and spread spectrum. More-
over, a number of security methods were studied which multiple techniques to boost system
security (e.g., combination of diversity techniques and cooperative jamming).
As highlighted in this thesis, conventional cooperative jamming strategies have some short-
comings. First, they require extra hardware to perform the jamming role which is an expensive
strategy. Next, cooperation between the helper and the network results in additional network
overheads and rises complexity. Furthermore, cooperative jamming strategies are not applica-
ble to general communication systems for the purpose of security enhancement. This research
presented novel remedies for the aforementioned shortcomings via proving solutions which do
not depend on extra nodes. Based on what was investigated, the main contributions using the
phase shift and artificial noise-based schemes, respectively proposed in chapters 3 and 4, are
summarized as:
1. In chapter 3, a random phase shift scheme was presented to secure transmission in a
two-hop relaying system in which the relay adopts DF protocol. To be more specific,
a random phase shift was inserted to the modulated data of both phases of transmis-
sion. The phase shift was created, benefiting from a shared secret information between
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communicating entities (e.g., the reciprocal channel between transmitter and intended re-
ceiver of each transmission phase can be used to create the secret key). Thus, the phase
shift could not be known at the illegitimate entity. Consequently, received SNR at the
unauthorized node was weakened, and growth in secrecy capacity was obtained. The
most important contributions of this scheme are highlighted in the following:
• This scheme did not require the collaboration with any additional node.
• The concern about the network overheads in convectional cooperative jamming was
resolved as extra helper was not incorporated.
• It was proven that the proposed solution raised the ergodic secrecy capacity and the
simulation results confirmed the theoretical outcomes of the proposed solution.
• Security analysis of the system model was presented, and the probability of outage
in secrecy capacity and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity were calculated as
closed-form formulations.
• It was shown that increasing the transmit power did not necessarily improve the
secrecy as it might cause more information leakage to the adversary nodes.
• The presented scheme is highly recommended for communication systems with
lower power recourses since additional amount of power for generating friendly
jamming is not required.
2. In the context of multi-hop communication systems, in chapter 4, a system model was
assumed where there existed multiple non-colluding illegitimate nodes. This study ex-
tended a new method of using cooperative jamming to the considered system model
where intentional interference was created at the transmitter of each hop. To be more
precise, the transmitters were capable of assigning a fraction of their available power to
generate friendly jamming at illegitimate entities. Major results of the proposed strategy
are stated as below:
• This novel technique of adopting cooperative jamming do not need any extra hard-
ware, on the contrary with traditional artificial noise strategies.
• Due to the particular importance of power allocation in cooperative jamming strate-
gies, between the friendly jamming and the primary signal, power assignment
strategies were presented. Initially, an optimal power allocation was suggested
which needed the channel state information of the wiretappers. Numerical results
showed that the optimal solution constantly boosted ergodic secrecy capacity.
• Since in the majority of feasible and applicable scenarios, CSI of the wiretappers
are not known, a sub-optimal solution was offered in which information about either
wiretappers’ CSI or their locations was not required. It was illustrated that the sub-
optimal solution was helpful for the case where the illegitimate entity was located
not far from the transmitter of the corresponding hop.
• Secrecy performance of the communication system model over Rayleigh fading
channels was presented and closed-form expressions of the probability of existence
of a positive secrecy capacity and secure outage probability were formulated.
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• It was shown that the capability of the proposed scheme for secrecy improvement
depends on different factors including the location of the entities and available
power.
5.2 Future work
Here are the suggested directions and open areas explored for future work:
1. The random phase shift scheme explained in chapter 3 can be further extended and im-
proved in the following manners:
• Focusing on generating random phase shift based on reciprocal channel between
communicating nodes can be a good area for further studies.
• The results of this work can be modified to communication in the presence of mul-
tiple colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers.
• The presented approach can also be used as a basis intuition in order to be adopted
in decentralized networks such as ad-hoc networks, or centralize networks, e.g.,
cellular networks, as a means to improve secrecy.
2. The new cooperative jamming strategy proposed in chapter 4 can be extended or further
studied in the following aspects:
• It can be generalized to the scenarios in which there exist multiple colluding eaves-
droppers that can wiretap communication.
• The provision of the shared friendly jamming between the communicating entities
can be investigated.
• It is also suggested to explore the impact of using such a scheme on the secrecy of
multi-hop AF relaying systems.
3. As mentioned in chapter 2, mobile operators have been interested in cooperative com-
munications in recent years due to its capabilities to provide high quality services such
as content aware applications, data oﬄoading, and even the potential role of the UEs as
relays to increase coverage. However, there are security concerns in UE-relaying sys-
tems which need additional research. For example: (i) It is necessary to ensure that
the intermediate UE is secure for the purpose of relaying. (ii) The possibility of secure
communication via untrusted UE relays is another interesting research topic. (iii) Most
existing studies only consider the impact of relaying strategy on the reliability of cellular
networks in order to reduce the cell edge effect and increase the quality of service. How-
ever, it is required to investigate the impact of UE-relaying on system’s secrecy as well.
In addition, a new research topic is designing the UE-relaying strategies which jointly
meet the reliability and security requirements.
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4. Most existing physical-layer studies have been proposed to mitigate the attacks which
target the confidentiality of networks. However, as pointed out in chapter 2, other secu-
rity requirements of wireless systems also expose attacks; therefore, future work should
analyze the attacks that target authentication or availability of cooperative communica-
tion systems. As another suggestion for future work, it is notable that current studies are
more concerned about passive eavesdropping attacks; however, active attacks should be
more considered in the future.
5. In a different direction, randomness of the channel between communicating entities has
been employed in a number of research papers to generate a secret key, and to improve
security. However, there are more unique physical layer characteristics which can be uti-
lized for secrecy improvement such as carrier frequency offset. In this regard, exploiting
other exclusive physical layer characteristics can be an area for further investigation.
6. It must be expressed that the current study similar to many existing methods has mainly
incorporated a physical-layer security solution for cooperative communications. And
less attention has been made to examine cross-layer security solutions where physical
layer and upper layers of the protocol stack collaborate efficiently through hybrid security
techniques to enhance security. Therefore, cross-layer security is another open area for
ongoing research.
7. Finally, it is notable that many theoretical and analytical studies have shown capabilities
of physical-layer schemes to enhance security. However, practical evaluation of a poten-
tial secure approach in realistic scenarios through experiments plays a key role in final
evaluation. To this end, excessive computational complexity and cost associated with
hardware should be both avoided.
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